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HARVARD LAW REVIEW
THE PROPER ROLE OF A TARGET'S
MANAGEMENT IN RESPONDING
TO A TENDER OFFER
Frank H. Easterbrook* and Daniel R. Fischel**
Under existing federal and state law, a corporation'smanagers
can resist and often defeat a premium tender offer without liability
to either the corporation'sshareholders or the unsuccessful tender
offeror. Professors Easterbrook and Fischel argue that resistance
by a corporation's managers to premium tender offers, even if it
triggers a bidding contest, ultimately decreases shareholderwelfare.
Shareholders would be better off, the authors claim, were such
resistance all but proscribed. The authors consider, but find wanting, a number of potential criticisms of their analysis; they conclude
by proposing a rule of mangerial passivity capable of controlling
resistance in actual cases.

cash tender offer typically presents shareholders of the
"target" corporation with the opportunity to sell many if
not all of their shares quickly and at a premium over the
market price.' Notwithstanding the apparent benefit both to
shareholders of the target and to the acquirer when such offers
succeed, the target's management may oppose the offer, arguing that the premium is insufficient or that the corporation
would be harmed by its new owners. To defeat the offer,
management may file suits against the offeror, sell new shares
to dilute the offeror's holdings, manufacture an antitrust prob-
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I See, e.g., Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 486 F. Supp. 1168 (N.D. Ill. ig8o),
appeal docketed, No. 8o-1375 (7th Cir. Mar. 21, x98o). Marshall Field involved a
shareholder's suit against management for defeating a tender offer with a premium
exceeding ioo% of the price just prior to formulation of offer plans.
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lem by acquiring one of the offeror's competitors, or engage in
a wide variety of other defensive tactics. 2 Sometimes the resistance leads to the target's being acquired at a price above
the initial bid, either by the original bidder or by a "white

knight,"' 3 and sometimes the resistance defeats the takeover
4
attempt altogether.

The ability of management to engage in defensive tactics
in response to a cash tender offer is a relatively recent development in contests for corporate control. Prior to the enactment of the Williams Act5 in 1968, offerors were free to structure offers in a manner designed to force shareholders to decide
quickly whether to sell all or part of their shares at a premium. 6 The target's management consequently had little time
to mobilize a defensive strategy to impede the offer. The
Williams Act, however, has deprived the offeror of this advantage of speed by regulating the conditions under which the
offer can be made. 7 More than half the states have enacted
2

The common defensive stratagems are set out in E. ARANOW, H. EINHORN &

G. BERLSTEIN,

DEVELOPMENTS

IN TENDER

OFFERS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL

193-2o6 (1977); A. FLEISCHER, TENDER OFFERS: DEFENSES, RESPONSES AND PLANNING (1978); M. LIPTON & E. STEINBERGER, TAKEOVERS AND FREEZEOUTS §§ 6.4-

6.6.3 (2978 & Supp. i98o); Hochman & Folger, Deflecting Takeovers: Charter and
By-Law Techniques, 34 Bus. LAW. 537 (I979); Nathan & Sobel, Corporate Stock
Repurchases in the Context of Unsolicited Takeover Bids, 35 BUS. LAW. 1545 (1980).
3 The recent battle between J. Ray McDermott, Inc., and Wheelabrator-Frye,
Inc., for control of Pullman, Inc., provides a notable illustration of the "white knight"
phenomenon. McDermott initiated the bidding at $28 per share in July x98o. Wheelabrator-Frye won the fight several months later with a bid of $52.50 per share,
covering more than five times the number of shares McDermott offered to purchase
initially. See McDermott, Inc. v. Wheelabrator-Frye, Inc., No. 80-23o6 (7th Cir.
Sept. 25, I98O); Wall St. J., Aug. 22, I98O, at 2, col. 2; id., Sept. 17, i98o, at 4, col.
2; id., Sept. i8, 198o, at 55, col. I.
4 See, e.g., Lewis v. McGraw, 619 F.2d 192 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, lol S. Ct.
354 (1980); Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 486 F. Supp. 1168 (N.D. Ill. i98o),
appeal docketed, No. 8o-1375 ( 7th Cir. Mar. 21, i98o); Labaton Co. v. Universal
Leaf Tobacco Co., [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,943
(S.D.N.Y. 1979); Berman v. Gerber Prods. Co., 454 F. Supp. 1310 (W.D. Mich.
1978); Grossman, Faber & Miller, P.A. v. Cable Funding Corp., [1974-1975 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 94,913 (D. Del. 1974); Northwest Indus. v. B.F.

Goodrich Co., 301 F. Supp. 706 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
5 i5 U.S.C. §§ 78g, 781-78n, 78s (1976).
6 Before 1968 offerors could limit the time an offer would be available, require
that tenders be irrevocable, or specify that if the offer should be oversubscribed the
first shares to be tendered would be the first to be purchased. Offers with such terms
produced considerable pressure for shareholders to tender quickly, lest they lose the
opportunity to realize the favorable terms.
7 See 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(5) (1976) (indirectly compelling every offer to remain open
for at least seven days by allowing shareholders to withdraw any shares they have
tendered during that time); 17 C.F.R. 240.I4d-7(a)(1) (298o) (rule promulgated by the
Securities and Exchange Commission extending the minimum period to I5 business
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tender offer statutes that go beyond the Williams Act in placing
8
restrictions on the ability of an offeror to wage a tender offer.
The effect of state and federal regulation of tender offers has
been to give the target's management the time to undertake a
defensive strategy. 9

The reaction of shareholders to managerial resistance depends on the outcome. Few protest when resistance leads to
a takeover at a higher price. Wheii resistance thwarts the
takeover attempt altogether, however, litigation usually follows. Although defeat of the takeover attempt may deprive
the target's shareholders of a substantial premium, shareholders' suits against management to recover this loss are almost
always unsuccessful. 10 Relying on the business judgment rule,
.courts typically have held that the target's management has
the right, and even the duty, to oppose a tender offer it.
determines to be contrary to the firm's best interests. 1 Com-

mentators generally have applauded the results of these
cases.

12

days); 17 C.F.R. 240.14d-7(a)(2) (ig8o) (SEC rule requiring the offer to remain open
for xo business days after another bidder makes a tender offer for the same class of
securities). For a criticism of the Williams Act, see Fischel, Efficient Capital Market
Theory, the Market for CorporateControl, and the Regulation of Cash Tender Offers,
57 TEX. L. REv. I (I978).
s To the extent that the state statutes are less hospitable to hostile takeover bids
than the Williams Act, they are of doubtful constitutionality. Compare Kennecott
Corp. v. Smith, 637 F.2d 181 (3d Cir. I98O), and MITE Corp. v. Dixon, 633 F.2d
486 ( 7 th Cir. i98o), appeal docketed sub norn. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 49 U.S.L.W.
3533 (U.S. Jan. 15, 1981) (No. 8o-i188), and Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577
F.2d I256 ( 5 th Cir. 1978), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Leroy v. Great W. United
Corp., 443 U.S. 173 4979), and Dart Indus. v. Conrad, 462 F. Supp. i (S.D. Ind.
1978) (unconstitutional), with Telvest, Inc. v. Bradshaw, 618 F.2d 1029 (4 th Cir.
198o) (probably constitutional), and AMCA Int'l Corp. v. Krouse, 482 F. Supp. 929
(S.D. Ohio x979) (constitutional), and Unitrode Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 399
N.E.2d 5 (Mass. 198o) (construing state statute to avoid constitutional problems). See
generally Note, Securities Law and the Constitution: State Tender Offer Statutes
Reconsidered, 88 YALE L.J. 510 (I979).

9 This has been recognized in several recent decisions that have held state tender
offer statutes to be unconstitutional. See Kennecott Corp. v. Smith, 637 F.2d i81
(3d Cir. 198o); MITE Corp. v. Dixon, 633 F.2d 486 (7th Cir. 198o), appeal docketed
sub non. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 49 U.S.L.W. 3533 (U.S. Jan. 15, 1981) (No. 8o1188).
10 See, e.g., Lewis v. McGraw, 619 F.2d 192 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, ioi S. Ct.
354 (i98o); Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 486 F. Supp. 168 (N.D. Ill. 198o),
appeal docketed, No. 8o-I375 (7th Cir. Mar. 21, 198o); Berman v. Gerber Prods. Co.,
454 F. Supp. 1310 (W.D. Mich. 1978). See also Treadway Cos. v. Care Corp., 638
F.2d 357 (2d Cir. i98o), rev'g in part 490 F. Supp. 668 (S.D.N.Y. 198o), discussed
at note ioi infra.
1"E.g., Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 486 F. Supp. II68 (N.D. Ill. I980),
appeal docketed, No. 8o-1375 (7th Cir. Mar. 21, 198o).
12See, e.g., Herzel, Schmidt & Davis, Why Corporate Directors Have a Right to
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We argue in this Article that current legal rules allowing
the target's management to engage in defensive tactics in response to a tender offer decrease shareholders' welfare. The
detriment to shareholders is fairly clear where defensive tactics
result in a defeat of a takeover, causing shareholders to lose
the tender premium. Even where resistance leads to a higher
price paid for the firm's shares, however, shareholders as a
whole do not necessarily benefit. The value of any stock can
be understood as the sum of two components: the price that
will prevail in the market if there is no successful offer (multiplied by the likelihood that there will be none) and the price
that will be paid in a future tender offer (multiplied by the
likelihood that some offer will succeed). A shareholder's welfare is maximized by a legal rule that enables the sum of these
two components to reach its highest value. Any approach that
looks only at the way in which managers can augment the
tender offeror's bid, given that a tender offer has already been
made, but disregards the effect of a defensive strategy on the
number of offers that will be made in the future and the way
in which the number of offers affects the efficiency with which
corporations are managed, ignores much that is relevant to
shareholders' welfare.
We attempt in Part I to furnish what the existing legal
literature and case law lacks: a framework for understanding
how defensive tactics affect the number of tender offers, the
price if an offer is made, and the price of stock in the event
no offer is made. Our investigation leads to the conclusion
that shareholders' welfare is maximized by an externally imposed legal rule severely limiting the ability of managers to
resist a tender offer even if the purpose of resistance is to
trigger a bidding contest. In Part II we consider and reject a
number of the arguments which have been raised against our
analysis of the proper role of a target's management in response
to a tender offer. Finally, in Part III we propose a rule of
managerial passivity that could be applied to control resistance
to tender offers, and show that such a rule would not be
inconsistent with the prevailing principles of fiduciary duty
that apply to managers or with the business judgment rule.
Resist Tender Offers, 3 CORP. L. REV. 107 (i98o); Lipton, Takeover Bids in the
Target's Boardroom, 35 Bus. LAW. 10, (1979); Steinbrink, Management's Response to
the Takeover Attempt, 28 CASE W. L. REV. 882 (1978). See also A. FLEISCHER,
supra note 2; Hochman & Folger, supra note 2; M. LIPTON & E. STEINBERGER, supra
note 2. Other authors, although skeptical about the motivation for resistance, would
allow defensive tactics in certain circumstances. See, e.g., Gelfond & Sebastian,
Reevaluating the Duties of Target Management in a Hostile Tender Offer, 6o B.U.L.
REV. 403 (ig8o); Lynch & Steinberg, The Legitimacy of Defensive Tactics in Tender
Offers, 64 CORNELL L. REV. 901 (i979).
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DEFENSIVE TACTICS AND SHAREHOLDER WELFARE

A cash tender offer at a premium over the market price
gives each shareholder the opportunity to obtain, with certainty, a return exceeding the current market value of the
target's stock. It would be possible, if overly simple, to stop
at this point and conclude that tender offers are beneficial to
the target's shareholders. Simple ideas do not always survive
scrutiny, and this one has been subject to challenge on the
ground that the markef price of shares does not reflect their
real worth. Instead, it is argued, the price of shares must be
too low at the time of the offer, for how else could the prospective acquirer offer to pay a premium? We address these
concerns in Section A below. In subsection I we examine how
the price of shares comes to reflect their value. In subsection
2 we discuss why bidders might offer more than the market
price. We then use the principles explained in Section A to
show in Section B how shareholders would be best off if
managers did not resist tender offers.
A. Tender Offers and the Markets for Stock and Managers
i. Efficient Capital Market Theory and the Price of Tender
Offers. - It is very unlikely that price and "value" will diverge
in large markets for shares. If there were such divergences,
investors could reap substantial gains by identifying and buying underpriced shares and selling overpriced shares.13 Since
there are many sophisticated investors with ample capital, the
arbitrage process would proceed quite quickly, and it would
become impossible to make systematic gains by finding undervalued shares. As investors bought and sold on the basis of
what they knew, their very activity would drive the price
toward the correct one. The change in the price would reduce
the gains available from identifying mispriced shares. Indeed,
once information about a firm reached the market, prices
would adjust quickly whether or not anyone traded, because
no trader with rational expectations would sell for less than
the price he expected the shares to reach once the news became
widespread.
The process of estimation and trading leads to prices that
embody all of the available information about the value of the
shares. Commonly referred to as the "efficient capital market
hypothesis," the proposition that it is not possible to make
abnormal gains by identifying and trading in mispriced stocks
13A share is "underpriced" or "overpriced" in relation to some future price. We
do not imply that a share has any intrinsic value.
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has been widely accepted. 14 It means that the price of shares
reflects the collective wisdom of all traders about the value of
the stock, and it also means that there is no reliable way to
determine the direction, amount, or even existence of any
difference between today's and tomorrow's price. If capital
markets are efficient, as the evidence shows them to be, 15 then
any statement that a given stock is really worth more than its
14 See note I5 infra. The statement that investors do not usually profit by acquiring new information in an efficient capital market raises interesting problems. If
the price of shares fully incorporates information about the firm, then no one has an
incentive to gather additional information. Yet information-gathering, followed by
trading, is the process by which prices come to embody the information. The more
closely price follows information, it seems, the less information there will be, and
consequently the more profitable it becomes to gather new information and beat the
market. The matter is not, however, paradoxical. Market participants will simply
secure information to the point where the marginal dollar invested in research equals
the gain to be had from making better projections. There will not be an equilibrium
with perfect information, but there is an "equilibrium degree of disequilibrium."
Grossman & Stiglitz, On the Impossibility of Informationally Efficient Markets, 70
AM. EcoN. REV. 393 (i98o). See also Langbein & Posner, Market Funds and TrustInvestment Law: II, 1977 AM. B. FOUNDATION RESEARCH J. I, 7-12. Because
information spreads quickly through the market, this equilibrium will be an optimal
guess about tomorrow's price of shares. Even though some people can make a living
by acquiring and trading on information, it is unlikely that anyone could improve on
the informativeness of the share's price as a method of summarizing the available
supply of knowledge.
,5 Several kinds of evidence support the proposition that stock markets are efficient: (I) Stock prices cannot be predicted by any mechanical rule, and the trend of
past prices provides no guidance about the trend of future prices. This indicates that
the current price already embodies any information obtainable from trends. (2) Stock
prices adjust rapidly to newly disclosed information, and the price adjustments are
unbiased in the sense that they do not systematically overshoot or undershoot the
eventual price. In most cases, the price adjustments actually precede the release of
new information, and there is thus no change at all when an apparently significant
disclosure is made. This indicates that "information leakage," see Hirshleifer & Riley,
The Analytics of Uncertainty and Information - An Expository Survey, 17 J. EcoN.
LITERATURE 1375, 1403-I

(1979), and the concomitant trading that occurs in antic-

ipation of announcements make the announcements themselves superfluous. In short,
stock prices embody all of the "public" information and more. (3) Changes in firms'
accounting practices, and hence in their apparent profits, have no effect on price.
This indicates that markets discount firms' attempts to manipulate information pertinent to price. Similarly, other changes of form, such as stock splits, also have no
effect on price, if adjusted for changes in dividend rate. (4) Market professionals are
unable to do better than casual investors in predicting stock movements. Professionally managed mutual funds, for example, do not perform better than portfolios selected
at random. (5) The elaborate disclosures required by the SEC do not make investors
better off; returns are no higher now than they were in the 1920's. See generally J.
LORIE & M.

HAMILTON, THE STOCK MARKET: THEORIES

AND EVIDENCE

70-98

(i973); Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work, 25
J. FINANCE 383 (1970); Jensen, Capital Markets: Theory and Evidence, 3 BELL J.
ECON. & MANAGEMENT SCI. 357 (1972); Note, The Efficient CapitalMarket Hypothesis, Economic Theory and the Regulation of the Securities Industry, 29 STAN. L.
REV. 1031, 1034-57 (1977).
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price is not believable;' 6 if a guess better than the market's
guess could be devised, the cost of making the improvement
(including the payments to researchers and analysts) would
exceed the gains from the knowledge.
It may be helpful to think of stock prices as reflecting
estimates of the probabilities of future states of the world. To
a great extent, price movements depend on the state of the
economy, the rate of interest, demand for the firm's product,
the skill (or luck) of the firm's managers, and so on. The price
of the stock on any given day will be a composite of the prices
the stock would assume under different assumptions about the
future. Suppose that the fortunes of one firm depend on the
success of some innovative process. If the process works, the
future earnings of that firm will be worth $ioo per share; if
it flops, the earnings will be worth only $20. If failure is 3
times as likely as success, then the shares will trade for $4o. 17
The price of the shares will rise or fall as new information
sheds light on either the probability of success (an increase to
I chance in 2 will lead to a price of $6o) or the profits if the
venture succeeds. Changes in the interest rate would affect
the way in which these earnings streams are discounted to
present value, thus affecting the price of shares. Other influences work in a similar way.
This illustrates why the constant, sometimes violent, movement of share prices is consistent with the proposition that
markets are efficient. When price changes, the change does
not show that the old price was wrong; it shows only that new
information has been incorporated into the price of the stock.
We can conclude from this, with some confidence, that a
tender offer at a price higher than the prevailing one also
16

For an argument that a market averages people's weighted beliefs about the

future and that the resulting prices are a better estimate of the correct probabilities
than any of the participants' estimates, see Verrecchia, Consensus Beliefs, Information
Acquisition, and Market Information Efficiency, 70 AM. ECON. REV. 874 (i98o).
17 The $40 figure is simply the average of the two outcomes weighted by their
relative probabilities of occurrence: (75% X 20) + (25% X IO) = 40. We assume
here that investors are risk neutral (indifferent to risk). A person is risk neutral if he
would pay the same amount for a ticket that entitled him to $i as he would for a
ticket that entitled him to participate in a coin flip in which he would receive $2 for
calling the coinr correctly. If he would pay more for the $2 ticket, he is risk preferring;
if he would pay less for the $2 ticket, he is risk averse. In the example, the shares
will trade for less than $40 if the shareholders are risk averse, more than $40 if they
are risk preferring. Whether shareholders act if risk averse depends on the extent to
which the risks of a particular stock can be eliminated by diversifying (i.e., owning
a basket of many stocks). Both theory and evidence suggest that if the risks are
diversifiable, shareholders will be indifferent to them; otherwise they will be risk
averse. See J. Lomb. & M. HAMILTON, supra note 15, at 171-259.
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exceeds the value of the stock. True, the target's managers
may know something about the firm's prospects not yet incorporated into the price of the shares. 18 But the disparity between price and worth could not last long. If a bidder tried
to steal the target by capitalizing on its special information,
the target's managers could defeat the offer by disclosing the
information to the public. 19 The price would adjust to reflect
the new information, and the offer would succeed only if it
were higher than the new price. Tender offers at a premium
thus must benefit the target's shareholders.
2. Agency Costs and Takeovers. - Although the efficiency
of capital markets implies that shareholders gain from tender
offers, it also seems to imply that bidders are irrational. Why
can a bidder identify underpriced stocks if market professionals
cannot? The bidder's knowledge would be shared by the target's management in most cases, and management could release the information, causing a price adjustment. The simple
fact that the bidder has made an offer might cause the information to leak to the market. Unless stock markets are substantially inefficient, 20 the bidder will not be able to acquire
a company for less than its.value under current conditions.
Commentators have proposed a bewildering number of explanations for mergers and takeovers. They include gains from

1SIf there were no prohibitions against insider trading, shares would not sell for
less than a price incorporating all information, since insider trades would move prices
to reflect even corporate secrets. See Fischel, supra note 7, at 24.
19 If the firm needed to act in secret to realize the value of its knowledge, management would be dutybound not to reveal the information. See, e.g., SEC v. Texas
Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 843-44, 850 n.12 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc) (secrecy
needed to enable acquisition of land under which the corporation had discovered
valuable ore of which the landowner was not aware), cert. denied, 404 U.S. xoo5
(1971). The existence of a duty to maintain secrecy, even in the face of a tender offer
for less than the eventual price of the stock, may constitute an exception to our more
general conclusion that shareholders' welfare would be maximized by managerial
passivity in response to tender offers. It is not an exception, however, if there is a
competitive market in acquisitions or if shareholders have rational expectations about
the prospects of their firms. Competitive bidders would protect the shareholders'
interests fully. For the technical argument about rational expectations, see S. Grossman & 0. Hart, The Allocational Role of Takeover Bids in Situations of Asymmetric
Expectations (U. Pa. Wharton School, White Center for Financial Research, Working
Paper No. 6-8o, Jan. 298o). For an empirical argument that shareholders do have
rational expectations, see Bradley, Interfirm Tender Offers and the Market for Corporate Control, 53 J. Bus. 345 (1980).
20 The qualification is important. Stocks traded over the counter may not always
have sufficiently liquid markets (or may not be the subject of sufficiently frequent
scrutiny) to ensure that their prices reflect all available information. If markets for
particular stocks are not efficient, it is not possible to say that every tender bid at a
premium is beneficial to shareholders. Even so, however, all of the arguments about
agency costs apply to these firms, and they support a rule of managerial passivity.
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increasing the ability of firms to employ information that
would leak if conveyed between independent entities, "synergy" gains as the combined firms obtain the value of some
savings in joint operations, and tax benefits. None of these
explanations is implausible, and none is inconsistent with a
belief that tender offers improve shareholders' welfare. 21 But
the savings and benefits attributable to each could be achieved
by friendly merger as well as by hostile tender offer. Since a
tender offer is by far the more costly device,2 2 one must consider whether some source of benefit both accounts for large

cash premiums and explains why a friendly merger did not
occur.

The most probable explanation for unfriendly takeovers
emphasizes their role in monitoring the performance of cor-

porate managers. The tender bidding process polices managers
whether or not a tender offer occurs, and disciplines or replaces
them if they stray too far from the service of the shareholders. 2 3 We offer the following explanation both to show what

we mean by agency costs 24 and to illustrate how the tender
bidding process influences these costs.

Corporate managers (which include both officers and members of the board), like all other people, work harder if they

21

The suggestion that offerors are attempting to realize the gains from nonpat-

entable information appears in Jarrell & Bradley, The Economic Effects of Federal
and State Regulations of Cash Tender Offers, 23 J.L. & ECON. 371 (i98o). They view
this as a welfare-increasing process. "Synergy," if it exists, also obviously increases
welfare. Tax reasons may seem more problematic. The acquired firm may have a
valuable tax loss or cash that can be passed to shareholders at the capital gains rate
through an acquisition. Moreover, a tender offer may capitalize the target's earnings
stream, distributing it as capital gains. Even tax-motivated takeovers improve efficiency: they free up assets that the target may be holding as cash (or investing
suboptimally) to avoid a distribution at high tax rates. The tender offeror receives
and can invest these assets without recognizing taxable gain. And, of course, a firm
may have acquired a tax loss as a result of suboptimal management. Finally, even
though a firm with inferior managers could achieve tax savings through an acquisition,
it is the firm with the best combination of tax advantages and good management that
can make the highest bid for the target. Given competition among acquirers, any
tax-motivated takeover is unlikely to reduce the efficiency with which the target's
assets are used.
22 The average cost of a tender offer before 1975 was 13% of the total postoffer
market price of the shares. Smiley, Tender Offers, Transactions Costs and the Theory
of the Firm, 58 REv. ECON. & STATISTICS 22, 30 (1976).
23 See Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. ECON.
1io (1965).
24 This use of "agency costs" was introduced by Jensen & Meckling, Theory of the
Firm: ManagerialBehavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FINANCIAL

ECON. 305 (1976). See also Alchian & Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and

Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REv. 777

(1972).
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can enjoy all of the benefits of their efforts. In a corporation,
however, much of the benefit of each manager's performance
inures to someone else, whether it be shareholders, bondholders, or other managers. The investors must be given a substantial share of the gains to induce them to put up their
money. 25 Because no single manager receives the full benefit
of his work, he may find that, at the margin, developing new
ventures and supervising old ones takes too much effort to be
worthwhile; each manager may reason that someone else is
apt to do the work if he does not or to take the rewards even
if he does well. No manager will be completely vigilant. So
some managers will find it advantageous to shirk responsibilities, consume perquisites, or otherwise take more than the
corporation promised to give them. One especially important
way in which managers' performance falls short of the ideal
is in choosing the firm's other agents. Because no manager
can obtain all of the benefits available to the firm from making
good decisions, none takes all cost-justified steps to recruit and
train those employees best suited for their jobs. As a result,
many firms will have some employees less than completely
dedicated to their jobs and other employees who, although
fully dedicated, ought not to be in the positions they hold.
These agency costs of less than optimal management cause the
firm's shares to trade for less than the price they would achieve
if agency costs were zero.
Shareholders might be able to reap substantial gains from
improving the performance of managers as their agents. 26 But
this improvement is difficult to achieve, and the difficulty is
25 Any siphoning of benefits by the managers is an agency cost even if the managers
put the existing resources of the firm to their socially optimal use. Unless all of the
benefits of new investment are returned to those who supply the firm's capital, there
will be too little investment in the future. The reduction in the incentive to invest is
a real social cost.
26 This is not to suggest that there is something undesirable in the fact that many
firms are controlled by managers rather than by stockholders. This "separation of
ownership and control," criticized so harshly in A. BERLE & G. MEANS, THE MODERN
CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932), and, less thoughtfully, in R. NADER,
M.

GREEN

& J.

SELIGMAN,

TAMING

THE GIANT CORPORATION (1976), is nothing

but another way of describing the division of labor. The separation enables skilled
managers to run enterprises even though they lack personal wealth, and it enables
those who have wealth to invest even though they lack managerial skills. Moreover,
this division of labor also enables investors to diversify their portfolios, in turn
lowering risk and making investment more attractive. See Langbein & Posner, Market
Funds and Trust-Investment Law, 1976 AM. B. FOUNDATION RESEARCH J. I; Posner,
The Rights of Creditors of Affiliated Corporations, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 499 (1976).
Corporations are contractual undertakings, and the founders of a corporation can
select that set of arrangements which maximizes their welfare. Separation of ownership and control would not emerge or survive if it did not serve important functions.
See R. WINTER, GOVERNMENT AND THE CORPORATION (1978). If separation were
not highly functional, investors would not entrust their money to managers. (Surely
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the reason why outsiders (tender bidders) play an important
role. The agency costs typically will go undetected by individual shareholders. Most shareholders are passive investors
seeking liquid holdings. They have little interest in managing
the firm and less incentive to learn the details of management.
No one shareholder can collect all or even a little of the gains
available from monitoring the firm's managers. The benefits
would be dispersed among all stockholders according to their
investments, not according to their monitoring efforts. Because other shareholders take a free ride on any one shareholder's monitoring, each shareholder finds it in his self-interest
to be passive. He simply sells his shares if he is dissatisfied.
The free riding problems that inhibit monitoring by shareholders are aggravated by the difficulty any shareholder would
face in doing anything about the firm's managers once he
discovered the existence of excessive agency costs. The shareholder who makes the discovery has no authority to compel
the firm to change its ways. He must either persuade the
managers or induce his fellow shareholders to oust the managers and install new ones. Yet persuasion is lost on misbehaving managers who need not listen. The cry of "turn the
rascals out" also is not of much use, because other shareholders
still find it in their self-interest to be passive. The shareholder
who has made the discovery must persuade his fellow shareholders to invest a significant amount of time in studying the
corporation's affairs. These shareholders would be willing to"
do so only if their attention and study could yield a benefit.
But here, too, free riding makes things difficult. Each shareholder will recognize that his votes will not affect the outcome
of any dispute unless he has a large bloc of shares. As a
result, each shareholder's self-interest leads him to ignore the
controversy; it is costly to become informed, and the cost
produces little prospect of benefit. If each shareholder reasons
in the same way, as he should, the managers of the firm will
prevail in any contest about their operation of the company.
And that is the pattern in the market. Shareholders routinely
vote for managers or pay no attention to elections. Successful
campaigns against managers are rare, and they seldom succeed
even if one dissident shareholder holds a large bloc of stock
that he can vote in his own favor.2 7
managers of large corporations have no monopsony power over investment opportunities.) The point we make in the text is consistent with a belief that, if shareholders
were required to "control" corporations more tightly than they do now, the price of
shares would be still lower.
27 The proclivity of money managers and trustees to vote for corporate management - much maligned in the legal literature - doubtless accounts for some of
management's lopsided success. But, for the reasons we have given in text, share-
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Corporate managers recognize that they can improve the
performance of the firm by reducing agency costs. Managers

monitor each other's performance and reward achievements;
bonuses and salary adjustments could be a form of "ex post
settling up" that substantially alleviates incentive problems, as
Eugene Fama has argued. 28 Gary Becker and George Stigler

have supplied a strong argument that if managers enjoy especially favorable salaries or other terms of employment, they

may be disciplined by the prospect of being fired. 29 Pensions
and retirement bonuses also help to coax good performance
30
from managers.

These devices, although more useful than monitoring by
shareholders, still are imperfect. They depend on the ability
of the firm to discriminate good performance from inferior

performance by each employee. But because managers typically work in teams, it is hard to determine the contribution

of each person. 31 The output of one group of managers depends on the quality of information and options supplied by

another group, and so on. The attempt to determine the
marginal contribution of each manager is bound to be difficult
and costly. Worse, the attempt to meter the contributions of
each manager, and to dispense rewards accordingly, encoun-

ters the free rider problem we have discussed. Because no
manager can obtain all of the benefits of monitoring his colholders would not be better off under a regime requiring trustees to make a "reasoned
judgment" on contested matters or to pass voting rights through to the beneficial
owners. If, as we have argued, the shareholders' self-interest has led them to be
ignorant and passive, a rule compelling them or their nominees to become informed
cannot make them better off. See Langbein & Posner, supra note 14.
2' See Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL. EcoN.
288, 295-3o6 (598o). Fama neglects, however, the problem of the discount rate. If
inferior management is not discovered for some time after the event, it may be
impossible to achieve a satisfactory ex post settling up.
29 See Becker & Stigler, Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and Compensation of
Enforcers, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 9-1O (1974).
30 The incentive provided by such devices obviously increases as the manager
nears retirement. So, too, does the need to give the manager an incentive. As a
manager becomes older, the effect on his future earnings of today's shirking and
malfeasance becomes smaller, and in the period just before retirement the manager's
incentive to work hard is smallest of all. See Becker & Stigler, supra note 29; Klein,
Crawford & Alchian, Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive
ContractingProcess, 21 J.L. & ECON. 297, 304 & n.17 (1978). Although ERISA bars
the forfeiture of pensions for misconduct and shirking, it does not prevent firms from
withholding retirement bonuses from its employees. See Hepple v. Roberts & Dybdahl, Inc., 622 F.2d 962 (8th Cir. 198o).
3 1 This explains why stock options and other profit sharing plans, which attempt
to minimize agency costs by making managers "owners," cannot be very effective. In
a large corporation, any one manager's efforts are likely to have only a trivial effect
on the price of the firm's shares.
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leagues, each one will be less than fully dedicated to the task. 32
Even the most dedicated manager will find it difficult to fire
or discipline an old friend when the benefits of ruthlessness
accrue to distant and unknown shareholders.
The methods of metering and monitoring within a firm are
thus unlikely to work well unless the management team as a
whole is subject to supervision and, if necessary, discharge.
The prospect that the team's work will be judged as a whole
gives senior managers a powerful incentive to create and use
intra-management control devices. Yet, as we have explained,
shareholder monitoring cannot supply the necessary supervision.
Tender offers are a method of monitoring the work of
management teams. Prospective bidders monitor the performance of managerial teams by comparing a corporation's potential value with its value (as reflected by share prices) under
current management. When the difference between the market
price of a firm's shares and the price those shares might have
under different circumstances becomes too great, an outsider
can profit by buying the firm and improving its management.
The outsider reduces the free riding problem because it owns
a majority of the shares. The source of the premium is the
reduction in agency costs, which makes the firm's assets worth
more in the hands of the acquirer than they were worth in the
hands of the firm's managers.
All parties benefit in this process. The target's shareholders
gain because they receive a premium over the market price.3 3
32 Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 24, suggests that there would always be inefficient management unless the ultimate supervisor received all of the firm's profits. As
we have explained in the text, in a publicly held corporation the shareholders (who
have the residual entitlement to profits) lack the incentive to serve as monitors.
33 But see Grossman & Hart, Takeover Bids, the Free-Rider Problem, and the
Theory of the Corporation, ii BELL J. ECON. 42 (1980). While recognizing the power
of the tender offer in disciplining management, Grossman and Hart believe that an
offeror could not induce the shareholders to part with their shares unless it had some
way of appropriating to itself the gains from the acquisition. They observe that, if
the offeror plans to profit by improving the firm's management, then it must expect
the postacquisition price of shares to be even higher than the offer price. Consequently, they reason, a shareholder will prefer the postoffer price to the tender price,
and he will not tender if his holdings are so small that they cannot affect the success
of the offer. And, of course, if everyone reasons in the same way, the offer will fail.
Grossman and Hart conclude that offerors should be able to "dilute" the price of
shares after the acquisition in order to overcome this tendency not to tender. Shareholders, knowing that dilution could follow the acquisition, will tender their shares,
and thus the threat of dilution need never be carried out.
This argument is not compelling. The tender offeror has two potent devices that
overcome the holdout problem. First, the offeror may specify that the offer is contingent on receipt of a sufficiently large percentage of the shares so that any share-
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The bidder obtains the difference between the new value of
the firm and the payment to the old shareholders. Nontendering shareholders
receive part of the appreciation in the price
34
of the shares.
More significantly for our purposes, shareholders benefit
even if their corporation never is the subject of a tender offer.
The process of monitoring by outsiders poses a continuous
threat of takeover if performance lags. Managers will attempt
to reduce agency costs in order to reduce the chance of takeover, and the process of reducing agency costs leads to higher
prices for shares.3 5 We now explore how different responses
to takeover bids influence the size of the benefit derived from
monitoring by outsiders in advance of any offer.
B. The Consequences of Management's Defensive Tactics
i. Resistance and Agency Costs. - The argument presented above establishes that takeovers are beneficial to both
shareholders and society. It follows that any strategy designed
to prevent tender offers reduces welfare. If the company
adopts a policy of intransigent resistance and succeeds in maintaining its independence, the shareholders lose whatever preholder's decision could affect the success of the offer. Since each shareholder knows
that all other shareholders will reason the same way he does, he will tender in order
to obtain the premium. Second, the offeror can acquire all of the shares with a
freezeout merger after it obtains control. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(f) (x974);
MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8I(a)(3) (1978). But cf. Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d
969 (Del. 1977) (requiring merger price to be fair). See Brudney & Chirelstein, A
Restatement of Corporate Freezeouts, 87 YALE L.J. 1354, 1359-65 (1978) (criticizing
restrictions on two-step freezeouts). Once the shareholders understand that holding
out will not enable them to obtain more than the tender offer price, they have an
incentive to tender their shares to obtain the premium as soon as possible.
The idea of dilution is nonetheless important in establishing rules with respect to
management's response to a tender offer. The ability of the offeror to obtain the
shares for less than their value in the hands of new management can be thought of
as dilution, and the existence of this dilution is essential to the profitability (and hence
the existence) of tender offers. See p. 1177 infra. The available evidence suggests
that share prices are "diluted" in this way. See Bradley, supra note I9.
34 The price of shares typically increases substantially after a tender offer, see note
76 infra, and state law often requires the tender offeror to pay at least the tender
offer price in order to complete a freezeout merger. See Roland Int'l Corp. v. Najjar,
407 A.2d 1032, 1037 (Del. 1979) (requiring "entire fairness" for freezeout merger);
Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977) (requiring business purpose); DEL.

CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262 (1974) (establishing appraisal rights). These restrictions on
freezeouts give controlling shareholders incentives to pay minority shareholders a
proportional interest in the gains produced by the acquisition.
35 Fischel, supra note 7; Manne, supra note 23. At least one court has recognized
the power of tender offer threats in increasing the price of shares. Dart Indus. v.
Conrad, 462 F. Supp. i, 8-9 (S.D. Ind. 1978).
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mium over market value the bidder offered or would have
offered but for the resistance or the prospect of resistance.
This lost premium reflects a foregone social gain from the
superior employment of the firm's assets.
The target's managers, however, have a substantial interest
in preserving their company's independence and thus preserving their salaries and status; the less effective they have been
as managers, the greater their interest in preventing a takeover. They may disguise a policy of resistance to all offers as
a policy of searching for a better offer than any made so far.
Extensive manuals describe both the stratagems of resistance
and the methods of disguise. 36 There is no signal that separates intransigent resistance from honest efforts to conduct an
auction for the shareholders' benefit. The fact that the first
tender offer or any subsequent offer is defeated supplies little
information, because any auctioneer understands that determined efforts to collect the highest possible price may lead to
37
no sale at all in the short run.
Even resistance that ultimately elicits a higher bid is socially wasteful. Although the target's shareholders may receive
a higher price, these gains are exactly offset by the bidder's
payment and thus by a loss to the bidder's shareholders.
Shareholders as a group gain nothing; the increase in the price
is simply a transfer payment from the bidder's shareholders to
the target's shareholders. Indeed, because the process of resistance consumes real resources, shareholders as a whole lose
by the amount targets spend in resistance plus the amount
bidders and any rivals spend in overcoming resistance. 38
39
These additional costs can be substantial.
36 See authorities collected note 2 supra. See also Lipton, supra note 12, at 1203o. New defensive strategies are constantly being invented. The latest is lobbying
for legislation to block the acquisition. See Wall St. J., Feb. I3, ig8i, at ig, col. 4.
37 Even if the target's management intends to conduct an auction, its noncooperative response to the offer may lead to an inferior disposition of the target's assets.
See Polinsky, Controlling Externalities and Protecting Entitlements: Property Right,
Liability Rule, and Tax-Subsidy Approaches, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (i979) (arguing that
noncooperative behavior sometimes frustrates the transfer of resources to the highest
valuing users).
3s As a general matter, expenditures that influence the distribution of trading gains
but do not generate better performance are simple waste. Society as a whole would
pay to prevent traders from fighting over the gains of trades that are bound to occur
anyway. For rigorous demonstrations of this, see Fama & Laffer, Information and
CapitalMarkets, 44 J. Bus. 289 (197I); Hirshleifer, The Private and Social Value of
Information and the Reward to Inventive Activity, 6i AM. ECON. REV. 561 (I97I).
Tender offers at premiums over the market price fall into the class of trades that are
bound to occur eventually.
39 Defensive acquisitions - ones that create antitrust problems for the bidder, but
would not otherwise have been made by the target - can be costly to consummate
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This argument may appear to be inconsistent with fiduciary

principles. If resistance touches off an auction, it may drive
up the price paid for the target's shares. 40

Ordinarily man-

agers are charged with the duty of maximizing the returns to
the firm's shareholders without regard to adverse consequences
to other firms' shareholders or to society at large. The standard economic assumption since Adam Smith introduced the
invisible hand has been that the firm's rational pursuit of its
self-interest yields more gains for it than losses for its rivals.
The result is efficient because the winners gain more than
enough to compensate the losers.

But this is not invariably true, and the recent experience
with pollution provides an example. When a firm treats the
air as a free good, society as a whole may lose more than the

firm gains. As long as the firm is entitled to disregard the
effects on third parties of the pollution it emits, it will consume
too much clean air in producing its products.
A related "externality" arises when a target's management
resists a tender offer. The resulting increase in the prices paid
for target firms will generally discourage prospective bidders
for other targets; when the price of anything goes up, the
and may involve inferior uses of the newly acquired assets. Litigation against the
offeror, extensive mailings to and solicitation of shareholders, and other defensive
tactics can be quite costly to both the target and the bidder. For example, in the
recent contest for control of Pullman, the fees paid to lawyers, investment bankers,
and similar participants in the fight were $17 million. When Mead Corporation
defeated Occidental Petroleum's bid in 1979, the cost was $i5 million. See Wall St.
J., Dec. 2, i98o, at i, col. 6; id. at 23, col. 2. There is a further cost of resistance
if the contest prolongs the period before the acquisition can be completed, for that
delays the achievement of the gains the acquisition will produce.
40 Bidding usually serves the function of allocating goods to their highest valued
uses; the best indication of the ability to put something to a valuable use is the
willingness to pay for it. In the housing market, for example, sellers regularly hire
brokers, who conduct an extended "auction" of the house to solicit the highest bid.
In the end the owner receives more money, and the house is sold to the person who
values it most highly. But a housing auction and a management-run auction for a
corporation differ in a number of important respects. Shareholders wishing to auction
off their corporation would not employ the firm's managers as their agents in the
auction because the managers' interests potentially conflict with the shareholders'
interests. See pp. 1198-99 infra. In addition, the market for corporate shares is far
more efficient than the market for parcels of real estate. The former establishes even
without an auction the value of corporations as currently managed. There is thus no
need to expend resources to duplicate what the market provides for free - an accurate
estimate of current value. Given the existence of a market price for shares, we know
that the transfer of the target firm to a higher bidding offeror produces gains for both
society and the target's shareholders. Even if the first bidder cannot put the target's
assets to the best possible use, those assets could be resold and eventually would end
up in possession of the firm that valued them most highly. See Coase, The Problem
of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. i (196o). Indeed, the first bidder's failure in that
situation to resell the target's assets to another higher valuing firm would constitute
inferior management that would expose the bidder itself to takeover.

RESPONDING TO TENDER OFFERS

I98I]

1177

quantity demanded falls. Changes in the incentives of bidders
affect the utility of monitoring by outsiders, and that affects
the size of agency costs and in turn the pre-offer price of
potential targets' stock. In order to explore the nature of these
effects, it would be useful to ask what rational shareholders
would do if, before a tender offer was in prospect, they could
bind the management to resist or to acquiesce in any offer.
Consider the effects of two polar rules. Under the first
rule, management is passive in the face of tender offers. If
there are no competing bidders, the first tender offeror will
prevail at the lowest premium that will induce the shareholders
to surrender their shares. Under the second rule, management
uses all available means to resist the offer. This resistance
creates an auction, so that no bidder can acquire the target
without paying a price almost as high as the shares would be
worth under the best practicable management. 4 1 For example,
shares of firm X are trading for $40. Outsiders could manage
the firm better so that the shares would be valued at $90
each. 4 2 A bid of $50 would induce a substantial majority of
X's shareholders to tender their shares. Under the first paradigm rule -

managerial acquiescence -

the bid of $50 would

ensure success. Under the second paradigm - resistance a tender offeror could not acquire X for much less than $go
per share.
Which of these rules maximizes the welfare of X's shareholders? If the question is asked ex post, after a tender offer
has been made, then plainly the shareholders would prefer the
second rule and the bidding war. But if the shareholders were
asked which strategy the managers should pursue ex ante,
prior to the offer, they would have substantial reasons to
choose acquiescence. It is easy to see why. If the target's
shareholders obtain all the gains from the transaction, no one
has an incentive to make a tender offer, and thus no one will
offer a premium for the shares. 4 3 The shareholders will be

41

Neither rule accurately describes a real possibility.

There would always be

some competition among offerors no matter what the target's management does, and
this competition would ensure that the bidder pays more than the absolute minimum
demanded by shareholders. At the same time, no defensive strategy would enable the
target's shareholders to receive the last nickel of gain, both because there is substantial
uncertainty about the value of the assets in the new owners' hands and because the
bidder who can make the best use of the assets would not have to pay much more
than the last offer of the bidder who could put the assets to the second highest use.
Nonetheless, the paradigm rules reveal tendencies; if one rule is clearly inferior to the
other, it follows that other rules similar to the inferior one should be avoided.
42 The shares would be valued at more than $90 were there no agency costs.
43 Indeed, there will be inefficiently little investment in monitoring by prospective
offerors whenever the target's existing shareholders can capture any of the benefits of
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stuck with their $40 shares. Under the strategy of acquiescence, however, the shareholders obtain $5o and are better
off.44
Prospective offerors must do substantial research to identify
underpriced corporations and to determine how their management can be improved. They may engage investment banking
houses and investigate the affairs of many corporations before
finding one whose management could be improved. The position of a tender offeror is particularly precarious because, at
the time it makes a bid, its investment in information about
the target is sunk. Perhaps the first bidder will invest $io per
share in finding out about many potential targets and then
exploring the prospects of X in depth. If it can acquire X for
$50 per share, it reaps a profit as high as $30 per share ($go
minus $io investigation costs, minus $5o tender price). The
bidder's profit falls to nothing when the tender offer price
reaches $So per share. Once the offeror announces its bid,
however, other potential acquirers learn the target's identity.
The bid itself, and the accompanying disclosures under federal
and state law, may reveal much of what the offeror has
learned. 45 If the offeror does not supply other bidders with
valuable information, the target's management may do so as
part of a strategy to set up an auction. But any other bidder
need not bear costs as high as those already incurred by the
first bidder. The subsequent bidders take a free ride, making
the monitor's endeavors. Cf. Grossman & Hart, supra note 33, at 54-58 (the optimal
"dilution factor" for society in takeovers is infinite, meaning that the offeror should
be allowed to confiscate the value of untendered shares in order to ensure that all
shares will be tendered).
44 This analysis can be generalized. As we noted at the outset, p. 1164 supra,
the value of any stock can be understood as the sum of two components: (i) the price
that will prevail in the market if there is no successful offer multiplied by the likelihood
that there will be none, and (ii) the price that will be paid in a future tender offer
multiplied by the likelihood that some offer will succeed. If the shareholders could
bind the firm's managers to follow a single rule, they would want them to follow a
strategy that maximized ex ante share value, (p)T + (I - p)M, where p is the
probability that a tender offer will succeed, T is the tender offer price, and M is the
market price of the shares in the event of no takeover. The shareholders would not
look solely at T, because any rule increasing the size of T decreases p and M. Using
the numerical example from the text, as T rises toward $go, p falls toward zero, since
a prospective offeror would not engage in the costly and risky efforts necessary to
investigate prospective targets and make a tender offer if it did not anticipate being
able to enjoy a substantial part of the gains.
45 Grossman & Hart, Disclosure Laws and Takeover Bids, 35 J. FINANCE 323,
327-33 (xg8o); Grossman & Hart, supra note 33, at 58 & n.25; Jarrell & Bradley,

supra note 21. Indeed, the existence of an offer by itself tells other prospective bidders
where to look, even if it conveys no other information. These other bidders can
confine their study to the target firm, although the first offeror undoubtedly incurred
costs in examining the records and prospects of many firms.
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a profit even if the price rises to $80 per share. As a result,
no firm wants to be the first bidder unless it has some advantage, such as speed, 4 6 over subsequent bidders to compensate
for the fact that only it had to incur monitoring costs. And,
of course, if there is no first bidder there will be no later
bidders and no tender premium.
Perhaps most important of all, requiring bidders to pay a
high premium will lead to a decrease in the price of the target's
shares. A bidder facing the prospect of paying a high premium
is less likely to monitor other firms, and the decrease in search47
ing for targets leads to a decrease in the number of bids.
Then the price of X's stock is likely to decrease because, with
the reduction in monitoring, agency costs rise.
For instance, assume that a bid of 2o% over the market
price will attract enough shares under the acquiescence paradigm to achieve success, but under the resistance paradigm
the premium must be 50% or more. As before, firm X's shares
would trade for $90 under the best practicable management.
The shareholder choosing one of the paradigm rules to bind
the managers would ask: How effective will outside monitoring
be in inducing my managers to come as close to optimality as
possible? The governing rule would influence managers' performance; if takeovers are more costly, there will be fewer
diligent managers in any given firm. Agency costs will tend
to increase to the point where further increases precipitate a
takeover.
Under a rule of acquiescence, where a premium of 20%
carries the day, excess agency costs cannot for long exceed $i5
per share. If the price falls below $75 per share ($9o divided
by 1.2), then potential bidders will begin to see the prospect
of a profitable takeover. The farther the price falls below $75,
the more profitable and hence the more likely a takeover.
Things look quite different to the shareholder, though, under
the resistance paradigm. Then the price could fall to $6o ($9o
divided by 1.5) in the market without attracting any interest
from potential bidders. The more effective resistance is in
raising the premiums after tender offers are made, the lower
46 If the making of a bid itself triggers an auction, the initial bidder is at a
disadvantage unless the period for tendering is very short. Before the enactment of
the Williams Act and state tender offer statutes, offers typically were open for only
a few days. See pp. 1162-63 supra. Speed was the essence of success. The statutes
creating delays have made auctions more effective in increasing tender premiums, but

in the process they have decreased the number of successful tender offers. Jarrell &

Bradley, supra note 21, at 398-403; see Fischel, supra note 7. Managerial tactics that
intensify the bidding war simply aggravate the problem a prospective offeror faces in
determining whether to invest in monitoring.
47 The available data show that the number of offers decreases as resistance
increases. See Jarrell & Bradley, supra note a, at 398-403.
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the share price can fall without attracting interest by bidders. 4 8
The shareholder trying to choose a set of instructions to management consequently would conclude that his welfare is best
served by instructions to acquiesce. Such instructions
give
49
managers the greatest incentive to perform optimally.
2. The Acquiescence Paradigm as an Implicit Shareholder
Agreement. - Our argument implies that resistance is costly
to shareholders and that logically they should seek to avoid
those costs by instructing managers to acquiesce in tender
offers. Theoretically, shareholders could assure acquiescence
by insisting on appropriate provisions in the articles of incorporation or bylaws. Such provisions would facilitate monitoring of managerial performance, and consequently the price of
shares of corporations with antiresistance provisions should
rise relative to other firms. Moreover, corporations must compete in the capital markets for funds, and they could obtain
these funds at lower cost if their articles constrained the defensive maneuvers of management.
Yet articles of incorporation rarely if ever contain antiresistance provisions. To the contrary, they sometimes contain
provisions to make acquisition difficult. Classified boards, cumulative voting, supermajority consent rules, and similar provisions may frustrate the tender offeror's attempts to take
control after it has purchased a majority of the common
stock.5 0 These provisions raise the effective price of an ac48 Of course, the shareholder would not think that resistance versus acquiescence
is the sole determinant of agency costs. Many other things, including monitoring
within management teams, influence the size of these costs. See p. 1172 supra. But
to the extent that a rule about resistance to tender offers affects these costs, the
direction of the influence is plain.
19 We have constructed the analysis in this subsection on the basis of a number of
simplifying and highly unrealistic assumptions. We have assumed that managers are
not attempting to defeat all offers and in their efforts to conduct an auction never
misjudge the price bidders would pay and so never erroneously defeat the offers. We
have assumed that managers never attempt to use resistance to appropriate to themselves some portion of the additional premium available in an auction. If these
assumptions are relaxed, then the shareholder's choice of which instructions to issue
to management becomes even easier. When managers have a right to resist, they can
sell nonresistance for soft jobs, comfortable consulting contracts, and substantial

severance bonuses. E.g., Singer v. Magnavox Co., 38o A.2d 969 (Del. 1977) (resistance dropped after management obtained employment contracts). It would be very
difficult for a court to separate these disguised bribes from the many economically
desirable employment and consulting arrangements worked out in mergers. The
shareholder could prevent that misappropriation of his gains - and the accompanying
transactions costs borne by the target - by issuing binding instructions to acquiesce
in tender offers.
50 M. LIPrON & E. STEINBERGER, supra note 2, § 6.2 (1978 & Supp. x980),
provides a catalogue of structural provisions designed to make takeovers difficult and
costly. See also Hochman & Folger, supra note 2.
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quisition and increase the offeror's risk. Managers sometimes
recommend to shareholders that such provisions be added to
the articles of incorporation, and shareholders routinely follow
these recommendations.
But these facts hardly suggest that shareholders approve of
management resistance. The great majority of public corporations have not adopted "porcupine" provisions making acquisitions more difficult, and general principles of fiduciary
duty restrict managers' options to do so. 5 1 More important,
shareholders would find it impossible to instruct managers to
acquiesce in tender offers because of the very agency and
monitoring problems that lead to the offers. Individual shareholders do not have the incentive to attempt to insert antiresistance provisions into the bylaws or articles of incorporation
or to oppose management on suggested porcupine provisions,
because no shareholder or coalition of shareholders can capture
the full value of such an action to the shareholders as a group.
If such a provision were inserted, managers could probably
delete it again by amendment.5 2 Even if one shareholder
waged a campaign on behalf of shareholders' interests, few
others would pay any attention, because no one shareholder's
vote is likely to affect the outcome. Dissatisfied shareholders
are more likely to sell their stock than attempt to change
the
53
corporation's bylaws or otherwise oppose management.
The situation here is similar to the situation in many other
areas of corporate law that recognize shareholders' inability to
54
monitor managers' performance. The Trust Indenture Act,
55
Bankruptcy Code, state corporation codes, and other statutes
s Numerous courts have recognized that managers' attempts to perpetuate them-

selves in control breach their fiduciary duty. See, e.g., Lerman v. Diagnostic Data,
Inc., 421 A.2d 906 (Del. Ch. 198o) (holding that managers may not change proxy
election rules if the change entrenches them in office); Cheff v. Mathes, 41 Del. Ch.
494, x99 A.2d 548 (1964); Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 393 N.E.2d 994, 419
N.Y.S.2d 920 (1979). Supporters of defensive action against tender offers repeatedly
counsel managers not to be candid about their objectives, lest candor lead to a finding
of violation of fiduciary responsibilities. E.g., M. LIPTON & E. STEINBERGER, supra
note 2, § 6.I.I (1978 & Supp. I98O) ("Preparation of a 'black book' of procedures to
be used in the event of a takeover attempt is not desirable because it may be used to
embarrass management in litigation by creating a 'credibility gap' for a management
that states it has acted in good faith and carefully considered a raider's offer.");
Lipton, supra note 12, at 120-30 (elaborate script for camouflaging the target's reasons
for resisting an offer).
52 Grossman & Hart, supra note 33, does not take proper account of this problem
in arguing that the founders of a corporation will select rules that make takeovers
attractive.
53 See pp. 1170-71 supra.
54 15 U.S.C. §§ 77aaa-77bbbb (1976 & Supp. I1 1979).
5 xi U.S.C. §§ 101-766, 1101-1146 (Supp. I1 1979).
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provide standard form "contracts" of the sort shareholders
would be likely to choose if they were in a position to do so.
With respect to tender offers, as elsewhere, the instructions
to
56
managers must be imposed from outside the corporation.
II. THE ARGUMENTS SUPPORTING THE RIGHT OF TARGET
MANAGEMENT TO ADOPT A DEFENSIVE STRATEGY

Our analysis cuts against the grain of many cases and a
substantial amount of commentary. The rationales offered to
support the right of target management to resist tender offers
can be grouped in four categories: (i) tender offers do not
increase welfare; (2) the target's shareholders benefit from price
increases when tender offers are defeated; (3) the target's management has obligations to noninvestor groups that may be
adversely affected by a tender offer; and (4) the target's management is obligated to prevent unlawful conduct. In the
sections that follow, we consider5 7 and reject each of these
rationales as a basis for resistance.
A. The Arguments That Tender Offers Do Not Increase
Welfare
Our argument relies on the premise that tender offers increase social welfare by moving productive assets to highervalued uses and to the hands of better managers. Numerous
commentators, however, have reached a contrary conclusion.
It has been observed, for instance, that many target companies
are "well run," have substantial amounts of cash from successful operations, and that the offeror retains the target's
management after acquiring control.5 8 These observations are
invoked to support an assertion that the acquired firms were
not doing poorly; consequently, the argument concludes,
tender offers do not move assets to better managers.
This is unpersuasive. It amounts to second-guessing the
market. Unless the acquirer is giving away its money, the
premium price paid for the shares indicates a real gain in the
productivity of the assets. If General Motors is willing to bid
$ioo for a ton of steel owned by General Electric, and GE
56 This is not, however, a general argument for governmental control of the
provisions of corporate charters. Far from it. Once the market for corporate control
and the market for shares are operating efficiently, corporate managers will be led to
choose whatever provisions of internal government maximize shareholders' wealth:
See R. WINTER, supra note 26.
57 We do not consider again the argument that defensive tactics are beneficial
because they raise the offer price, viewed ex post. See pp. 1175-80 & notes 38-49

supra.
5' See, e.g., Lipton, supra note

12.
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sells, we would count this as a value-increasing transaction
despite the fact that GE otherwise would have put the steel
to "good use" (perhaps $9o worth). The highly subjective
observation that acquired firms are well run does not exclude
the possibility that, in new hands, the firms would be better
run. Only proof that markets are not efficient in pricing shares
could support the argument that tender offers do not improve
the use of resources.
That acquired firms often are cash rich, perhaps implying
successful past operations, also does not demonstrate that takeovers are undesirable. To the contrary, that a firm holds a
substantial cash position indicates agency costs. Cash can be
invested. The acquirer. usually invests the cash it obtains in
the takeover, thus putting idle resources to work. The retention of the target's management after a takeover also is not
significant. Although the management may keep their old
titles, they often lose effective control to officers of the acquirer. Retention in office may be a form of bribe, paid to
secure acquiescence in the takeover, rather than a signal of
satisfactory performance. 59
Martin Lipton has advanced a related argument: Tender
offers decrease social welfare because they "adversely affect
' 60
long-term planning and thereby jeopardize the economy."
But he fails to demonstrate how long-term planning is "adversely affected," let alone the economy jeopardized. The
threat of takeovers does not prevent managers from engaging
59Retention also would be expected under the specific information approach taken
by Jarrell & Bradley, supra note 21.
60 Lipton, supra note I2,at I05. Lipton states that the issue is "[w]hether the
long-term interest of the nation's corporate system and economy should be jeopardized
in order to benefit speculators interested not in the vitality and continued existence of
the business enterprise in which they have bought shares, but only in a quick profit
on the sale of those shares." Id. at 104. As discussed in the text, Lipton is simply
wrong in concluding that tender offers injure the long-term interests of the corporate
system and economy. Moreover, his attack on speculators (arbitrageurs) who are
interested "only in a quick profit on the sale of [their] shares," id., is unwarranted.
Arbitrageurs perform a constructive role by purchasing and selling shares. They offer
shareholders who wish to sell their shares at a profit in advance of a tender offer (and
thereby avoid the risk that the offer will be defeated, oversubscribed, or never made)
the opportunity to do so. By constantly searching for firms that are likely to be the
subject of a tender offer, arbitrageurs also make the market more efficient. Finally,
arbitrageurs, by selling their shares to an offeror, contribute to the transfer of assets
to those who can manage them more efficiently. That the arbitrageurs are not
interested in "the vitality and continued existence of the corporate enterprise in which
they have bought shares," id., hardly distinguishes them from the typical shareholder
of the large publicly held corporation. Arbitrageurs, like other shareholders, buy and
sell shares in order to make a profit. By doing so, they contribute to market efficiency,
provide a necessary check on suboptimal management, and facilitate the transfer of
control to more capable managers.
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in long-range planning. If the market perceives that management has developed a successful long-term strategy, this will
be reflected in higher share prices that discourage takeovers.
To be sure, the risk of a tender offer ensures that corporate
managers will be unable to assume that they can continue in
office indefinitely. But this risk of displacement does not reduce welfare. Precisely the opposite is true; some insecurity
of tenure is necessary to spur managers to their best performance. Society benefits from an active takeover market, therefore, because it simultaneously provides an incentive to all
corporate managers to operate efficiently and a mechanism for
displacing inefficient managers.
Harold Williams, former Chairman of the Securities and
Exchange Commission, has argued that tender offers decrease
welfare because they divert resources that otherwise could be
used for capital investments and instead are used only to
rearrange the ownership of existing corporate assets. 6 1 The
answer to this argument is that funds used to finance a tender
offer are not necessarily diverted from investment to consumption. They are merely shifted from the acquiring corporation
to the target's shareholders. The acquiring corporation could
equally well have distributed these funds as dividends or put
them to other non-investment uses. There is also no reason to
assume that the target's shareholders will use these funds for
consumption rather than capital investment. The shareholders
may reinvest what they receive from the tender offeror. There
is, therefore, no reason to conclude a priori that an62active
takeover market diverts funds from capital investment.
Tender offers have also been characterized as "raids" in
which the offeror pays a premium for a working majority of
the shares in order to loot the firm to the detriment of the
minority shareholders. 63 It is unlikely, however, that any
61 Speech by Harold Williams Before the Seventh Annual Securities Regulation
Institute (Jan. 17, ig8o), reprinted in [1979-I98o Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 82,445. The Director of Policy Planning of the Federal Trade Commission

has made a similar argument. Reich, Pie-Slicers vs. Pie-Enlargers,WASH. MONTHLY,
Sept. ig8o, at 13.
62 Williams' argument is based on the premise that we should encourage firms

with accumulated cash to make new capital outlays in plant and research and development, rather than encouraging these firms to take over other existing firms. This
argument, however, would deny shareholders the right to the most profitable rate of
return by forcing firms to make new capital outlays when a takeover or merger would
be more profitable. Williams' related concern that the tender offer dollars paid to
target shareholders may not be invested because of the dearth of new equity issues in
recent years would be best answered by tax measures to encourage new equity, such
as lowering the 70% maximum individual income tax on dividends.
63 This argument was raised most frequently during debates on the Williams Act
and is still frequently made on behalf of the target's managers. Its classic expression
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tender offer for a substantial percentage of a company's shares
will be motivated by a desire to loot the acquired corporation.
A looter generates no new value, and thus cannot afford to
pay a premium price for all shares. Even if a bidder seeks
less than all shares, it cannot pay a significant premium for
those it obtains. If, for example, the offeror acquires for $i5
per share 70% of a firm whose shares had been trading for
$io, it cannot hope to make a profit by looting. Also, looting
from minority shareholders violates established rules, 64 and a
bidder would not be likely to escape detection if it violated
these rules.
Another argument against tender offers portrays them as
reducing the welfare of the shareholders of the acquirers by
more than the premium paid to the target's shareholders. In
this view, tender offers represent self-aggrandizing empire
building by acquiring managers who err in deciding what firms
to acquire or what price to pay.65 The difficulty with this
view is its implicit assumption that product and labor market
constraints (and the tender offer process itself) do not discipline
managers. A corporation headed by an empire-building management team that did not maximize profits would fare poorly
in the product market and would have lower share prices; its
managers would fare poorly in the employment market. The
corporation itself would become a takeover candidate.
Finally, it has been suggested that takeovers create monopolies. 66 Profit increases that come about because of monopis the statement by Senator Harrison Williams in commenting on an earlier version
of the Williams Act:
In recent years we have seen proud old companies reduced to corporate

shells after white-collar pirates have seized control with funds from sources
which are unknown in many cases, then sold or traded away the best assets,

later to split up most of the loot among themselves ....
The ultimate responsibility for preventing this kind of industrial sabotage
lies with the management and the shareholders of the corporation that is so
threatened. But the leniency of our laws places management and shareholders
at a distinct disadvantage in coming to grips with the enemy.
III CONG. REC. 28257-58 (1965).

Looting may be seen as similar to stealing, which redistributes rather than increases
welfare. However, if looting were prevalent, a decrease in welfare would actually
occur, as the risk of looting perpetrated by managers with no interest in running
acquired companies well was factored into the price of shares ex ante. This would

lead to a reduction in all share prices.
64 See, e.g., Gerdes v. Reynolds, 28 N.Y.S.2d 622 (Sup. Ct. 1941).
6S Marris & Mueller, The Corporation, Competition, and the Invisible Hand, x8
J. EcoN. LITERATURE 32, 36-37, 42, 46 (2980) (discussing other articles).
66 See, e.g., i Mergers and Economic Concentration:Hearings on S. 6oo Before
the Subcommittee on Antitrust, Monopoly and Business Rights of the Senate Judiciary
Committee, 96th Cong., ist Sess. 61-io6 (1979) (testimony of Assistant Attorney

General John Shenefield) [hereinafter cited as Merger Hearings]. But see G. BENSTON,
CONGLOMERATE MERGERS 26-31 (I980).
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olization produce reductions in social welfare. This view,
however, is contradicted by the evidence. Most tendei offers
raise no antitrust problems, and one careful study has shown
that takeovers 67
generally reduce concentration in the acquired
firms' markets.
The raider, managerialist, and monopolist models of tender
offers are also contradicted by data on stock price movements.
Most of the movement in the price of a stock is correlated
with movement in the market as a whole and depends on
general economic conditions. But the movements in individual
stock prices net of movements in the market give a rough
picture of the fortunes of the issuing companies, and data
about these movements for individual companies - called
cumulative average residuals, or CAR's - are powerful indicators of a company's performance.
Each of the views of tender offers, including the welfaremaximizing view that we advance, implies a particular pattern
of acquirers' and targets' CAR's. The proposition that tender
offers move assets to better uses implies that, because the
acquirers are looking for targets with suboptimal performance,
the prices of the targets' shares would decline relative to the
market for a period prior to the offer. The targets' CAR's
would begin to rise again, shortly before the offer was announced, as information leaked to the market. The CAR's of
the untendered shares would show significant gains over the
preannouncement position. The offeror's CAR's should show
little abnormal movement, because offerors should not be able
to make more than a competitive return (given the extent of
risk) on their investment in the target.
If, on the other hand, tender offers are conducted to raid
the assets of the targets, the CAR's of targets would be steady
until word of the offer leaked to the market; then they would
decrease, as investors feared the worst. The CAR's of the
minority, untendered shares would plummet after the acquisitions were completed. The CAR's of offerors should rise, in
anticipation of gains from looting, once word reached the market.
If tender offers harm the acquirers because their management acquires the wrong firms or pays prices that are too high,
then the acquirers' CAR's should be steady or declining until
word leaks, after which they would decrease. The CAR's of
the targets would be steady until shortly before the offer, when
67

Goldberg, The Effect of ConglomerateMergers on Competition, 16 J.L. & EcoN.

137 (1973).

198I).

See also R. POSNER & F. EASTERBROOK, ANTITRUST

921-42 (2d

ed.
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they would increase. Untendered shares would not appreciate
in price.
Finally, if tender offers are an instrument of monopolization, the CAR's of both firms should be steady before word of
the acquisition spreads, and then both CAR's should rise in
68
anticipation of monopoly profits.
A great deal of evidence has been accumulated on the
movement of CAR's before and after tender offers. 69 The
evidence shows that the CAR's of acquired firms decline
steadily for approximately forty months before the offer. A
month or two before the offer, they begin to rise. After the
offer has been completed, the nontendered shares continue to

trade at a significant increase over the pre-offer price. The
CAR's of the offerors rise when the offer is made. The estimates of gains to targets' shareholders run from 14% to 50%;
70
the estimated gains to offerors' shareholders are 5% to io%.
68 The CAR's we have described for the various views of tender offers will not
necessarily describe the status of every target firm but rather will describe averages.
For instance, the raid theory does not require that pre-offer market-line residuals of
every target be steady. An occasional pre-offer decreasing or increasing residual is
compatible with the raid theory. However, because average residuals are zero (indicating that share prices track market price movements), we would expect on average
fiat CAR's for targets under the raid theory. This is because the raid theory suggests
no reason why acquirers would be looking for firms whose performance is not average.
69 Bradley, Interfirm Tender Offers and the Market for Corporate Control, 53 J.
Bus. 345 (198o); Dodd, Merger Proposals, Management Discretion, and Stockholder
Wealth, 8 J. FINANCIAL ECON. Io5 (i98o); Dodd & Ruback, Tender Offers and
Shareholder Returns, 5 J. FINANCIAL ECON. 351 (I977); Ellert, Mergers, Antitrust
Law Enforcement and Stockholder Returns, 31 J. FINANCE 715 (1976); Jarrell &
Bradley, supra note 21; Kummer & Hoffmeister, Valuation Consequences of Cash
Tender Offers, 33 J. FINANCE 5o5 (1978); Mandelker, Risk and Return: The Case of
Merging Firms, I J. FINANCIAL ECON. 303 (1974). Other studies are summarized in
R. POSNER & K. SCOTT, ECONOMICS OF CORPORATION LAW AND SECURITIES REGULATION 228-31 (1980); G. BENSTON, supra note 66, at 35-45; 2 Merger Hearings,

supra note 66, at 9-48 (testimony of Richard Posner).
70 Dodd & Ruback, supra note 69, found that targets' shareholders received average premiums of 21% and acquirers' shareholders obtained nominal gains. Bradley,
supra note 69, at 346, concluded that the targets' shareholders received a premium of
49% (relative to the price two months before the offer), while bidders' shareholders
obtained an appreciation of 9% over the same period. Dodd, supra note 69, found
gains of 33.96% to targets' shareholders relative to the price io days before the offer.
Mandelker, supra note 69, at 314, found gains of 14% for the targets' shares and no
abnormal gains for offerors. Jarrell & Bradley, supra note 2i, at 389-90, found
premiums of 30% to 70% for the targets' shareholders.
These results obviously differ on the extent of the gains. But differences such as
this should be expected. The studies concentrate on different samples of offers in
'different years, and they use different periods of reference for computing price changes.
It should not be surprising, therefore, that some studies also appear to find that
takeovers produce little effect. Firth, The Profitability of Takeovers and Mergers, 89
ECON. J. 316, 323 (1979), concluded that in the United Kingdom from 1972 to 1974
offerors suffered losses that almost exactly offset the gains of the targets' shareholders.
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In the judgment of the market, then, tender offers increase
welfare. They rescue firms with declining CAR's but do not
hurt the acquiring firms. Most of the gain goes to shareholders
of the target, who benefit whether or not they tender. After
the acquisition has been completed, the minority untendered
shares of the target continue to trade at prices significantly
higher.than the pre-offer price. 7 1 The acquiring firms' prices
increase continuously before the acquisition - not the pattern
we would expect if bidders were managed by self-aggrandizing
men. 7 2 This pattern of security prices is inconsistent with the
raiding, managerialist, and monopolist views of tender offers
but is consistent with the value-maximizing approach that we
73
adopt.
B. The Argument That Share Price Increases Justify
Resistancefrom Target's Management
Several commentators have noted that even if a tender bid
fails, the share price of the target often rises, sometimes to
more than the tender offer price. 74 If shareholders so benefit,
the argument goes, then management is justified in resisting
tender offers. Although the data marshalled to support this
Firth speculated that the market structure of the United Kingdom might be different
in some respect from that of the United States but otherwise was at a loss to explain
his findings. Other scholars conclude that bidders suffer slight losses. Dodd, supra
note 69, found that successful bidders appear to sustain losses of 7.22%. Marris &
Mueller, supra note 65, at 42, 46, summarizes other studies indicating that bidders
may be slightly optimistic. But this, too, is consistent with our approach; if an auction
occurs, the prize goes to the highest bidder, and the highest bid is the most likely to
suffer from unfulfillable expectations.
71Although the nontendering shareholders receive substantial gains, Bradley, supra
note 69, at 346, finds that they do not receive quite as much as the tendering
shareholders. This tends to confirm the argument of Grossman & Hart, supra note
33, at 46, that corporations will allow acquirers to "dilute" the nontendered shares
slightly in order to encourage a majority of shareholders to tender.
72 Both Mandelker, supra note 69, and Ellert, supra note 69, found that the CAR's
of acquiring firms increased substantially in the four to eight years before the offer.
This suggests that offerors are doing relatively well and that the offer serves to bring
new assets within the control of the offerors' superior managers.
73 Most of those who argue that tender offers do not increase welfare neglect the
wealth of recent data. For example, Gelfond & Sebastian, supra note I2, at 45358, asserts that tender offers do not move assets to higher valued uses yet cites none of
the recent relevant studies of CAR movements. And Lipton, supra note 12, at io6og, ignores not only these studies but the earlier profit studies as well. It was in the
beginning of the 1970's that economists developed the procedures necessary to discriminate among the possible explanations for tender offers. Any analysis that overlooks these results is of dubious validity.
74 Dodd & Ruback, supra note 69, at 362-63; Jarrell & Bradley, supra note 21, at
397-98; Lipton, supra note 12, at io6-o9, 132-33.
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point varies in quality, 75 the premiums offered in unsuccessful
offers appear to be less than the appreciation after the offer is
defeated. 76 This fact calls for explanation.

The most plausible reason for a price increase following
the tender offer's defeat is that the market sees the defeat as

simply one round in an extended auction. The market anticipates that in the future another offeror -

one not saddled

with the first offeror's higher costs of information -

will ac-

quire the target. Many management-induced withdrawals are

increase as the
followed by higher offers, 7 7 and share prices
78
eventual acquisition becomes more likely.

Another possible explanation for the price increase following a defeated tender offer is that the offer itself served to

rouse the target's management to action. The offer warned
management to improve its performance, and either the offer

the
or the accompanying public disclosure may have provided
79
target's management with the information to do so.

Regardless of the cause of the price increase, shareholders
in general have little cause for rejoicing. The price rise comes

about because someone is taking a free ride on information
generated by the first offeror. Free riding of this sort reduces

the incentive to make the first offer, and, for the reasons we
have developed earlier, decreases the amount of monitoring,

75 In particular, Lipton's data is unpersuasive. See Lipton, supra note 12, at
io6-o9, 132-33. Lipton studied 36 unsolicited tender offers that were defeated between 1973 and 1979. Nineteen of the 36 target firms were trading at a higher price
than the rejected offer as of June x979. But Lipton does not attempt to determine
whether the price changes resulted from general market movements or from the defeat
of the tender offer. Nor does he consider the possibility that the price of the firm's
shares would have been still higher if the tender offer had succeeded. Finally, by
focusing on share price after an offer is defeated, Lipton ignores the ex ante interest
of shareholders in keeping prices high. See pp. I177-8o & notes 41-49 supra.
76 See Bradley, supra note 19, at 348, 368-72. Bradley found that unsuccessful
offers had a premium of 29%, while the shares appreciated 45% relative to their price
two months before the offer. He concluded that this finding demonstrates that shareholders have rational expectations - that is, that they refuse to take an offer if the
shares will become more valuable on the defeat of the offer. Id. at 375.
77 See Lipton, supra note 12, at io6-o8.
78 The data discussed in note 70 supra appear to support the explanation. However, to test our hypothesis precisely would require dividing targets into two classes
- those in which managers demonstrate a plan to defeat all offers, and those in
which managers attempt to elicit a higher offer. We predict that the price of the
former will plummet when the tender offer is withdrawn, while the price of the latter
will rise relative to the pre-offer price. No such research has been done, perhaps
because of the considerable difficulty of separating firms accurately into these two
categories.
79 See Dodd & Ruback, supra note 69; Grossman & Hart, Disclosure Laws and
Takeover Bids, supra note 45; Jarrell & Bradley, supra note 21.
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decreases the number of offers, and harms shareholders in the
long run.80
C. The Argument That DirectorsHave a Duty to Protect the
Interests of Noninvestor Groups
Several commentators have argued that directors of a target
company, when confronted with a tender offer, have a duty
to consider the interests of various noninvestor groups such as
employees, customers, creditors, and the community in general. 8 1 Even if a tender offer presents shareholders with an
opportunity to sell at a profit, these commentators would allow
management to resist the tender offer if it believed that the
offer would adversely affect these noninvestor groups.
This proposal is deeply flawed. First, its advocates make
no attempt to explain why a successful tender offer should be
deleterious to the corporation's employees, suppliers, or creditors. Takeovers improve economic efficiency, and that improvement usually enhances the position of those who deal
with the firm. The new owners cannot improve the firm's
performance by discarding valuable employees or suppliers or
by harming the interests of creditors. 8 2 The new owner would
harm itself in the process of harming the firm. Second, even
if the new owners have new policies concerning employees,
plant location, and so on, how can existing managers know
whether these policies are detrimental on balance? Most likely
the existing managers have little information about the operational decisions to be made by their successors. And if they
had such information, what could they do with it? 83 Which
80 See p. 1175 supra (defensive strategies are not beneficial even though they raise
the offer price).
81 Lipton, supra note i2; Steinbrink, supra note i2; Speech of Harold Williams
Before the Seventh Annual Securities Regulation Institute, supra note 61.
82 If maintaining good community relations is in the interest of the firm, then the
new owners will maintain the existing policies. And if the target's community relations
were not in the firm's interests, then the old management was diverting shareholders'
wealth to friends or other favorites. If the existence of such diversion were demonstrable, it would amount to a breach of the managers' fiduciary duty to shareholders
whether or not a takeover occurred.
83 Managers should not be allowed to consider whether creditors, suppliers, or
employees will be displaced in deciding whether to oppose a tender offer. The risk
of displacement is an inevitable and indispensable characteristic in any free market
economy. Any attempt by management to minimize this risk by preventing new
owners from having the opportunity to operate more efficiently, with existing or (if
necessary) new inputs of production, is anticompetitive. Such behavior is more characteristic of medieval guilds than of free markets.
Moreover, as we have emphasized, outsiders have no incentive to discard existing
policies that are in the firm's best interests. Cf. McKenzie, Frustrating Business
Mobility, REG., May/June ig8o, at 32 (arguing that proposed laws that attempt to
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groups are to be considered by management? Should manage-

ment be obligated to balance losses to existing noninvestor
groups against the (presumably greater) gains to other noninvestor groups as a result of the tender offer? 84 Even if these
hurdles can be overcome, how should management balance
the effect of a tender offer on noninvestor groups with the
impact on shareholders? 85
Finally, the proposed approach amounts to rejection of the

idea that agents (managers) are accountable to their principals
(shareholders).

So long as it continues to be lawful to form

corporations for profit, shareholders are entitled to hire managers dedicated to the shareholders' interests alone. The duty

of management is to operate efficiently and thus maximize the
return to shareholders.8 6 Maximization of shareholders' wealth

ultimately works to the advantage of workers and suppliers,
because shareholders gain only from the firm's mutually ben-

eficial transactions with those persons. If the proposed approach were adopted, however, management would, in certain
minimize employee and community dislocation by preventing businesses from moving
to areas where they can operate more efficiently are anticompetitive and hurt the
communities and workers they attempt to protect).
84 The argument has been made that defense is justified because the target firms
are run by "locals," with appropriate concern for their home towns, and that the new
"outside" owners will disregard these ties. Cf. Herald Co. v. Seawell, 472 F.2d io8
(ioth Cir. 1972) (directors of newspaper have obligation to public and employees in
addition to stockholders). This argument is overly provincial. Why should the old
suppliers or the community in which the firm operates count for more than the new
suppliers or new home base chosen by new management?
85 If a successful tender offer would give shareholders a 20% return on their
investment, but might cost certain employees their jobs, should management oppose
the tender offer? What if the premium is larger but a longtime creditor might lose a
valuable source of business? The number of problems could be multiplied indefinitely.
Our point is that although management, at least in nonconflict-of-interest situations,
is best situated to determine what actions will maximize the return to shareholders,
it is hardly qualified or authorized to balance shareholders' interests against the
uncertain effects of an acquisition on various vaguely defined noninvestor groups.
86 This is unquestionably the prevailing view. See Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 204
Mich. 459, 507, 17o N.W. 668, 684 (1gg) ("A business corporation is organized and
carried on primarily for the profit of the stockholders. The powers of the directors
are to be employed for that end. The discretion of directors is to be exercised in the
choice of means to attain that end and does not extend to a change in the end itself
.... "); CorporateDirector'sGuidebook, 33 Bus. LAw. 1595, 1621 (1978); Hetherington, Facts and Legal Theory: Shareholders, Managers and Corporate Responsibility,
21 STAN. L. REv. 248, 279-80 (1969). The most recent cases continue to adhere to
this view. One court, for example, held that United States Steel Corporation had no
common law or contractual obligation to consider the effects of plant closures on
employees or the communities in which the plants were located. Local 1330, United
Steel Workers v. United States Steel Corp., 631 F.2d 1264, 1279-82 (6th Cir. I980).
But cf. Herald Co. v. Seawell, 472 F.2d io8i (roth Cir. 1972) (holding that directors
of newspapers have obligation to public and employees in addition to stockholders).
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cases, sacrifice the interest of the shareholders to the interests
of noninvestor groups.8 7 Such a result, far more than the
separation of ownership and control or any other characteristic
of the modern corporation, would greatly prejudice shareholders by decreasing the incentive of management to act in their
best interest. A manager responsible to two conflicting interests is in fact answerable to neither. A principle of divided
loyalty ultimately would harm everyone by reducing the willingness of people to entrust their money to managers. 88
D. The Argument That DirectorsHave a Duty to Prevent
Violations of Law
A final justification for resistance to tender offers is target
management's alleged duty to prevent unlawful conduct. 8 9 In
furtherance of this duty, managers have instituted litigation
against offerors to prevent asserted violations by the offerors
of the antitrust laws and the Williams Act. In many cases,
the expense and delay caused by the litigation are sufficient to
defeat the tender offer, even if the underlying claim is frivolous.
But what is the source of management's duty? If managers
act on behalf of shareholders, the duty must come from a need
to prevent injury to these shareholders. If a given act involves
a violation of law, penalties may follow. Managers' duty calls
for them to minimize the sum of penalty costs and the cost of
compliance with the rule. 90 But the first link in the chain is
the possibility of injury. There is no duty to spend the firm's
resources to prevent some other party from exposing itself to
a penalty. Indeed, unless a party is actually injured by a
violation, it generally does not have even the right to sue. The
question, therefore, is what injury (in penalties or other costs)
the target corporation or its shareholders could suffer if the
offeror violates the law.
With respect to alleged antitrust violations, it is difficult to
see how the shareholders will suffer "loss or damage by a
Jensen & Meckling, Rights and Production Functions: An Application to
Labor-managed Firms and Codetermination, 52 J. Bus. 469 (1979), makes a convincing
argument that programs in which noninvestors have claims to the firm's income will
make all claimants (including the nonowners) worse off.
88 This defect in the proposal for management responsibility to noninvestor groups
is shared by similar proposals to place representatives of various constituent groups
on the board of directors. Apart from the insoluble practical problems of determining
who should be on the board and how votes should be allocated, constituent representation plans inevitably have the effect of decreasing management's accountability to
shareholders.
'9 See, e.g., Lipton, supra note x2; Steinbrink, supra note 12.
90See Engel, An Approach to CorporateSocial Responsibility, 32 STAN. L. Rv.
r1,
37-58 (1979).
87

RESPONDING TO TENDER OFFERS

1193

violation of the antitrust laws." 9 1 The acquired company suffers no "loss or damage" because it generally becomes richer
rather than poorer. 92 Only the acquirer can violate the Clayton Act; 93 the target's shareholders are not exposed to any risk
of penalty.
Shareholders who receive and hold the offeror's stock could
conceivably be injured, however, if the new combined firm is
assessed treble damages for an antitrust violation. But this
possible future injury would not serve as the justification for
an antitrust suit brought by the target's management. There
is no assurance that such damages will be assessed. The shareholders could avoid any risks by selling in the market. That
the bidder's stock is worth more than the target's shares surrendered in the offer suggests strongly that the possible future
liability is less than the apparent future gains from the offer.
Because the target's management has a duty to the tendering
shareholders who risk losing the tender offer premium if the
offer is defeated, it cannot logically raise the uncertain prospect
of antitrust liability as a reason why shareholders should be
compelled to forego a sure gain. Management's proper course
if it believes that a successful tender offer would violate the
antitrust94 laws is to refer the matter to the Department of
Justice.

Suits to redress alleged violations of section 13(d) of the
Williams Act 9s present a more difficult problem. Because Congress has enacted the statute to ensure that shareholders of a
target company receive accurate information concerning the
offeror and its plans, 9 6 the offeror's noncompliance may injure
the target's shareholders. It is by no means clear, however,
91 To obtain injunctive relief under § x6 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1976),
a party must establish "loss or damage by a violation of the antitrust laws." See
Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477 (1977). The Court held
there that a plaintiff cannot recover damages unless it can demonstrate antitrust
injury; that is, it must prove that its injury resulted from that which made the

defendant's conduct unlawful. After Brunswick a strong argument can be made that
a target company has not suffered any antitrust injury resulting from the tender offer,

even if an illegal combination results. See Fischel, supra note 7, at 38. This same
point has been made more recently in 2 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAwV

346b, at 248-49 (1978), and was apparently adopted in A.D.M. Corp. v. Sigma
Instruments, Inc., 628 F.2d 753, 754 (ist Cir. i98o).
92 See Missouri Portland Cement Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 498 F.2d 851, 866-67 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 883 (1974).
93 Section 7 applies only to acquiring firms. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976).
94 Management also could inform the shareholders of its belief and let them make
their own decision whether to tender.
95 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(i) (1976).
96 For critical analyses of this requirement that an offeror disclose its plans, see
Fischel, supra note 7, at 12-13; Grossman & Hart, Disclosure Laws and Takeover
Bids, supra note 45; Jarrell & Bradley, supra note 21.
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that management should be allowed to represent shareholders'
interests under the Williams Act by bringing suit; the interests
of the two groups may conflict in this situation, 97 and there is
too great a risk that a management-initiated suit will be a
dilatory tactic intended to defeat a tender offer beneficial to
shareholders. 98 Here, as with antitrust concerns, management's best course is to refer the matter to the appropriate
government agency, in this case the Securities and Exchange
Commission.
III. THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE AND
MANAGERIAL PASSIVITY

Our thesis that managers of target companies should acquiesce when confronted with a tender offer has not been
adopted by courts and state legislatures. As we indicated at
the outset, courts have generally gone in the opposite direction,
holding that directors have not only the right but also the duty
to resist tender offers that they believe to be not in the best
interests of their shareholders.9 9 Although some decisions find
particular defensive tactics to be unlawful, 10 0 they are exceptions to the general rule permitting or even requiring defensive
strategies.
The most significant conceptual impediment to judicial,
and perhaps even legislative, adoption of a rule requiring managerial passivity has been the notion that assessing the economic merits of tender offers, like judging the merits of any
other prospect facing the corporation, is peculiarly within the
ability of management. This sense that decisions regarding
the future of the corporation are best made by its managers is
embodied in the business judgment rule1 0 1 - a common law
97 For a discussion of the conflict of interest between managers and shareholders

when a tender offer has been made, see pp. 1197-98 infra.
98 Another barrier to a suit to enjoin a tender offer for a violation of § 13(d), 15
U.S.C. § 78m(d)(I) (1976), by the offeror is that the Williams Act contains no such
express private right of action. Compare Dan River, Inc. v. Unitex Ltd., 624 F.2d
1216 (4 th Cir. i98o) (holding that a target may sue under § 13(d)), and Kirsch Co. v.
Bliss Laughlin Indus., [i98o Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,580
(W.D. Mich. July i, I98O) (same), with Gateway Indus. v. Agency Rent A Car, Inc.,
[198o Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,540 (N.D. Ill. June io, 198o) (no private
right of action under § 13(d)).
99 See p. 1163 supra.
100 Klaus v. Hi-Shear Corp., 528 F.2d 225 (9 th Cir. 1975); Podesta v. Calumet
Indus., [I978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,433-34 (N.D. Ill.);
Condec Corp. v. Lunkenheimer Co., 230 A.2d 769 (Del. Ch. 1967).
101 See p. 1163 supra. The precise meaning of the rule is in dispute. Compare
Veasey & Manning, Codified Standard - Safe Harbor or Uncharted Reef, 35 Bus.
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doctrine that, at least outside the realm of tender offers, has
long insulated managerial decisions from judicial scrutiny.
Under the business judgment rule, managers enjoy considerable freedom to direct the corporation as they see fit. Without
some showing of either bad faith or self-dealing, courts almost
uniformly refuse to subject the decisions of managers to review
on the merits.
Our purpose in this Part is to harmonize our proposal of
managerial passivity with the business judgment rule and demonstrate that the rule should never serve to justify a decision
to oppose a tender offer. We also attempt to provide some
guidelines for courts to use in determining whether management has engaged in conduct for the purpose of defeating a
tender offer.
A. The Rationale and Limits of the Business Judgment Rule
The shareholder-owners (and also bondholders) of a corporation must select agents (managers) to run its affairs. If
the corporation is publicly held, the managers are unlikely to
own a significant proportion of the firm's securities. As we
have repeatedly emphasized, agency costs are an inevitable
consequence of this relationship. Yet courts generally do not
scrutinize managers' conduct. Quite the contrary, after satisfying themselves that particular business decisions were made
in good faith by the managers and were not tainted by selfdealing, courts invoking the business judgment rule typically
decline to inquire further. While it may at first appear anomLAW. 99 (ig8o), with Arsht & Hinsey, Codified Standard - Same Harbor But
Charted Channel: A Response, 35 Bus. LAW. ix (July i98o).
The recent case of Treadway Cos. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357 (2d Cir. 198o),
rev'g in part 490 F. Supp. 668 (S.D.N.Y. i98o), illustrates the strength of the business
judgment rule, once it has been invoked. Care acquired 31% of Treadway's stock
and indicated an intent to obtain control. Treadway's management responded by
"selling" a large block of shares to a third party; the buyer obtained a commitment
by Treadway to repurchase the shares. The district court concluded that this deal
was inexplicable except as a strategem to frustrate Care and to maintain Treadway's
managers in office, and it found that Treadway had made no serious study of the
consequences of a takeover by Care. It enjoined Treadway from voting these new
shares. The court of appeals reversed, relying on the business judgment rule. It
found that the plaintiffs had not carried their initial burden of establishing that the
directors had an interest in the transaction or acted in bad faith. Id. at 380-88. It
therefore was irrelevant that the directors could not establish that they had a proper
purpose in issuing the shares.
Treadway is not a tender offer case - it involved an attempted takeover through
a proxy contest by a minority shareholder. Such a situation raises some prospect that
the new controlling party will not look after the interests of the majority of the
shareholders. The case is, therefore, not strictly inconsistent with the analysis of the
business judgment rule that we offer below. It is, nonetheless, at odds with the spirit
of our proposal.
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alous for courts to give managers such broad discretion given
the inevitability of agency costs, there is no tension between
the rule and shareholders' welfare.
The application of the business judgment rule contributes
to the efficient management that shareholders desire. There
is no reason to think that courts generally could improve the
performance of managers. Courts lack the experience and
information necessary to make business decisions. Although
sometimes a court might be able to detect inferior decisionmaking or other agency costs, the burden of inquiry in the run
of cases almost certainly would carry costs larger than the
gains available in the few cases where courts could improve
matters. Even if judges were well suited to the task of reviewing business judgments, the ratio of suits to improvements
would be high, because plaintiff-shareholders, just like courts,
would lack the information necessary to challenge managerial
decisions intelligently.
Moreover, it is doubtful that shareholders would gain from
having better decisions made on the basis of additional information developed in litigation. Many business decisions are
made on the basis of suggestive but inconclusive information.
Rational shareholders would not have it otherwise, however,
for their welfare is maximized by decisions that yield the highest profits net of the costs of gathering information and making
the decisions. Yet after things go awry, it is easy for a shareholder to contend that managers gathered too little information. If information-gathering and deciding costs are disregarded - as they often are by courts - then a different
business decision may be preferred over the one management
actually took. But because shareholders would not want managers to disregard information-gathering and deciding costs in
search of better decisions, they also would not favor a legal
rule that paid too little attention to those costs.
There is no reason to believe that judicial scrutiny is more
effective in policing management than various market forces,
which provide incentives to management to operate efficiently
and keep share prices high. One mechanism creating such an
incentive is the market for corporate control, particularly the
tender offer market, which we have discussed at length. Indeed, the ability of shareholders freely to trade their shares,
and thereby vote on current management, is no doubt the
most powerful check on agency costs. 10 2 Other market incentives exist to ensure that management will generally act in the
best interests of shareholders. Competition in the product and
102

See R. WINTER, supra note 26.
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services market, for example, ensures that a firm that is inefficiently managed will not survive over time. Similarly, the
market for managerial services provides managers with considerable incentive to operate efficiently so as to increase the
market value of their own services. 10 3 Finally, various compensation packages, such as stock option plans, by making
managers owners, also attempt to provide management with
incentives to keep share prices high by linking managerial
compensation to the firm's performance. 10 4 In light of these
various incentives to keep share prices high, management's
interest in maximizing share price corresponds (if imperfectly)
to the shareholders' interest in maximum return on their
investment. There is little need to add to these automatic
devices a process of judicial review that is costly and unlikely
to identify or correct real errors of business judgment.
But market forces are not fully effective in making the
interests of managers and shareholders coincide. Some selfdealing transactions pose an especially great risk of malfeasance. The clearest example of this may be emptying the corporate treasury and fleeing to Honduras with the proceeds. At
the same time, courts are especially adept at discovering fraud,
deceit, or pocket-lining in business transactions. An inquiry
into fraud does not require an examination of the wisdom of
any business decision.
For these reasons, the rules that govern the managers' duty
of care have been distinguished from the rules governing the
duty of loyalty. When managers have acute conflicts of interest, they must bear the burden, unaided by any presumption
or deference, of establishing that the transaction was "fair"
(beneficial) to the firm.1 05 The duty of loyalty and the duty of
care thus are treated differently, with the business judgment
rule covering only the latter. This limitation on the scope of
the business judgment rule, like the basis of the rule itself,
rests on principles that maximize the welfare of shareholders.
103 Poor management may lead to reductions in the managers' salaries and bonuses.
Other managers may also fire the shirkers. Fama, supra note 28; Jensen & Meckling,
supra note 24. Managers with a history of poor performance will also command lower

salaries at other firms.
104 Stock option plans, however, cannot eliminate the problem of suboptimal
management. See note 31, supra.
t0SE.g., Lewis v. S.L. & E., Inc., 629 F.2d 764 (2d Cir. 198o); Wilderman v.
Wilderman, 315 A.2d 61o (Del. Ch. 1978); Ross Transport, Inc. v. Crothers, 185 Md.
573, 45 A.2d 267 (1946). See also Maldonado v. Flynn, 413 A.2d 2251 (Del. Ch.)
(refusing to apply the business judgment rule to a motion to dismiss a derivative suit),
contingently dismissed on res judicata grounds, 417 A.2d 378 (Del. Ch. ig8o) (in light
of Maldonado v. Flynn, 483 F. Supp. 274 (S.D.N.Y. ig8o)).
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B. Defensive Tactics and the Business Judgment Rule
In view of the recognized limits on the scope of the business
judgment rule, it is surprising that courts have invoked the
rule so freely as a basis for refusing to review the defensive
conduct of managers faced with a hostile tender offer. A
frequent consequence of a successful takeover attempt is the
replacement of incumbent managers. For acquirers, replacement of target management is typically a significant motive for
making the tender offer in the first place; for the target's
shareholders, such offers present the most effective means of
manifesting disapproval" of management. Given the serious
and unavoidable conflict of interest that inheres in any decision
on one's own ouster, courts ought not to make available to a
manager resisting a tender offer - and, in effect, fighting
against his own replacement - the same deference accorded
to the decisions of a manager in good standing.
Indeed, unlike transactions involving a conflict of managerial interest outside the realm of tender offers, efforts undertaken by target management primarily to resist a takeover bid
should not even be susceptible of the justification that they
happen to benefit the target. Such efforts to resist should
instead be proscribed completely. Conflicts transactions outside the realm of tender offers are not similarly interdicted
because they typically involve corporate decisions that shareholders, as a practical matter, simply cannot make. 10 6 But in
deciding whether to accept or reject a tender offer, managers
enjoy no particular comparative advantage over shareholders.
The decision does not involve management of the corporation's
affairs in any meaningful sense and thus can be made by
shareholders even though they are not involved in those affairs
to any significant degree.
Moreover, the rationales underlying the policy of judicial
restraint embodied in the business judgment rule in no way
counsel against implementation of a rule of managerial passivity. The deference accorded managerial decisions under the
106

The decision whether to oppose a tender offer is different from other "inter-

ested" director transactions such as the setting of salaries or the making of contracts
with a related entity. Because of the dangers presented by a conflict of interest in
these latter situations, courts are likely to scrutinze these transactions closely to prevent
harmful self-dealing. But it could not seriously be argued that the best way to
minimize the risks created by a conflict of interest would be for shareholders to
establish the salaries of directors or make contracts for the corporation. These types
of decisions, regardless of the inevitable conflict of interest, must be made by management as agents for the firm; the shareholders themselves have neither the time, the
expertise, nor the interest to become involved with running the corporation's affairs.
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business judgment rule reflects, in part, the inability of courts
to make better business decisions than managers and, in part,
the inefficiency that would result were managers encouraged
to disregard the costs of gathering information and making
decisions. A rule of managerial passivity does not require
courts to make business decisions at all, let alone better decisions than managers. To implement a rule of passivity, all10a7
court need do is determine whether managers were passive.
It need not gather costly information nor induce managers to
incur inefficiently large costs of decisionmaking to stave off
litigation. Under a rule of passivity, managerial decisions
would be subject to attack only if designed to defeat takeover
bids, and not for being inadequately researched. 108
C. The Role of Management in Responding to a Tender Offer
Compared with the Role of Management in Other
Fundamental Corporate Changes
Our proposal that managers should be passive in response
to a tender offer might appear to be at odds with the broad
107
108

See pp. X201-03 infra.
Some commentators have suggested, however, that if the decision to oppose a

tender offer is taken pursuant to the recommendations of a truly independent committee of the board of directors, courts should apply the business judgment rule.
Gelfond & Sebastian, supra note i2; see Speech by Harold Williams Before the
Seventh Annual Securities Regulation Institute, supra note 6I. This proposal fails to
take account of several considerations. "Independent" directors may not be so independent in passing on such matters, for they effectively serve at the pleasure of the
managers whose jobs are at stake in a takeover. These managers provide the information on which the outside directors will act. See Galef v. Alexander, 615 F.2d 5i
(2d Cir. i98o); Maldonado v. Flynn, 413 A.2d 1251 (Del. Ch.), contingently dismissed
on res judicata grounds, 417 A.2d 378 (Del. Ch. i98o) (in light of Maldonado v.
Flynn, 483 F. Supp. 274 (S.D.N.Y. ig8o)). But cf. Lewis v. Anderson, 615 F.2d 778
(gth Cir. i98o) (good faith exercise of business judgment by special litigation committee
is immune from judicial scrutiny); Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 393 N.E.2d
994, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920 (i979) (no judicial inquiry into actions of special litigation
committee appointed by board of directors). More important, however, the independent director proposal assumes that directors, even if disinterested, have the right to
decide for the shareholders, ex post, whether or not the shareholders may sell their
shares. By making this assumption, however, the independent director proposal
disregards the need for a binding policy of acquiescence in order to maximize shareholders' welfare ex ante. Any attempt to resist a tender offer will have the effect of
increasing the amount of agency costs by raising the offerors' costs and decreasing the
number of offers. And the resulting decrease in the effectiveness of monitoring will
lead to a fall in the price of shares when the assessment is made ex ante. This decline
in share price will occur regardless of whether the managers (or disinterested directors)
decide to resist. See pp. 175-80 supa. For shareholder wealth to be maximized ex
ante, the decision whether or not to sell when a tender offer is made must be made
by the shareholders and by shareholders alone.
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discretion that management has in negotiating a merger or
deciding whether the firm should be sold or liquidated. 10 9 The
difference in treatment is justified, however, by the differences
between the role played by the board in tender offers and its
role in these other situations.
By statute, 110 the board of directors negotiates a merger as
the firm's agent. So long as the board continues to exercise
agency authority, there is little reason to second-guess its decision to disapprove a merger. Only at great cost, if at all,
could a court determine whether rejection of a proposed
merger was a mistake. The performance of the board in its
role as agent is policed by market forces. If the board attempts
to siphon the benefits of the merger to itself, or obstinately
refuses to negotiate based on a policy of being independent,
the prospective partner can simply make a tender offer. The
tender offer, therefore, is an essential safety valve to ensure
that managers evaluate merger proposals in the best interests
of the shareholders.1 1 1 A legal rule that allowed the target's
management the same discretion in responding to a tender
offer as it has in responding to a merger proposal, therefore,
would decrease the number of mergers as well as the number
of tender offers, because a valuable check on management
would be lost.
The analogy to the lack of any obligation on the part of
management to make a periodic decision whether to sell or
liquidate is similarly irrelevant. A tender offer presents shareholders with a concrete price at a premium over market. The
offeror has borne the necessary costs of investigation, and the
target's shareholders obtain the benefit. In contrast, the board
could not decide whether to sell or liquidate without investing
substantial sums in getting an estimate of realizable proceeds.
The advice of investment bankers or other experts is inexact
and quite expensive. Constant expenditure of funds for this
purpose is not likely to be justified.
If it could somehow be determined that the firm is worth
more sold or liquidated than as a going concern, then it should
109 Several commentators have suggested that the rules concerning tender offers

be modeled on the role of the board in mergers. E.g., Lipton, supra note 12; Herzel,
Schmidt & Davis, supra note 12. It has also been suggested that since directors have
no obligation to make a periodic decision whether to sell or liquidate, they should
similarly have no obligation to accept a tender offer. Lipton, supra note z2.
110 State corporation statutes typically provide that a vote of the directors is
necessary to submit a merger proposal to the shareholders. See, e.g., DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8, § 251(b) (I974).
"I This safety valve aspect of tender offers is implicitly recognized by state cor-

poration statutes, which typically require that directors approve a merger proposal
but impose no similar approval requirement in the case of tender offers.
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be sold or liquidated. This is a fundamental principle of bankruptcy law.1 1 2 True, management of a solvent firm has no
duty to sell or liquidate in this situation. But if it does not,
the company will be an attractive tender offer candidate. The
offeror then can sell or liquidate and thereby appropriate the
resulting gains for itself and for remaining minority shareholders. Again, therefore, the tender offer acts as a safety valve
and helps to induce managers to serve the shareholders' interests.
D. The Meaning of ManagerialPassivity
Although we have concluded that shareholders would want
management to be passive in the face of a tender offer, we
have not attempted to define precisely what we mean by passivity. Doubtless, managers must carry out the corporation's
ordinary business. Perhaps, too, management should be able
to issue a press release urging shareholders to accept or reject
the offer. 113 The offeror also will convey its views to the
shareholders, who can act on these messages in light of the
self-interest of both the management and the offeror. 114 But
almost any other defensive actions expend the target's resources and produce no gain to investors. Thus, management
should not propose antitakeover charter or bylaw amendments,
file suits against the offeror, acquire a competitor of the offeror
in order to create an antitrust obstacle to the tender offer, buy
or sell shares in order to make the offer more costly, give away
to some potential "white knight" valuable corporate information that might call forth a competing bid,
or initiate any other
115
defensive tactic to defeat a tender offer.
Our proposal for managerial passivity does not mean, however, that managers must go to sleep when they suspect an
112

(1940).
113

N.

BucHANAN,

THE ECONOMICS OF CORPORATE ENTERPRISE chs. 14-15

SEC Rule 14e-2, 17 C.F.R. 240.14e-2 (198o), requires the target's management

to inform the shareholders of its position with respect to a tender offer within io days
of its announcement. This release of information may lead to a change in share
prices, and defeat of the offer, if significant facts previously were unknown to traders.
See p. I168 supra.
114 Section 14(e) of the Williams Act prohibits false and deceptive statements by
both a target and an offeror. I5 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1976).
I1s It is irrelevant to our analysis whether the incumbent management has a
"policy" dispute with the offeror. We question, therefore, the approach in the line of
Delaware cases which hold that directors can lawfully expend resources to defend
their positions when corporate policy is at stake. E.g., Cheff v. Mathes, 41 Del. Ch.
494, 199 A.2d 548 (1964); Kois v. Carey, 39 Del. Ch. 47, i58 A.2d 136 (i96o); Martin
v. American Potash & Chem. Corp., 33 Del. Ch. 232, 92 A.2d 295 (1952); see Fischel,
supra note 7, at 35, 40-42.
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imminent tender offer. A requirement of managerial somnolence would deprive the corporation of valuable business opportunities and might give firms a device for hindering their
competitors' operations. Yet many legitimate business decisions could have the effect of making the corporation less
attractive to the bidder and thus could be called resistance.
It is also possible, however, that many business decisions,
ostensibly taken for the purpose of seizing valuable business
opportunities, are actually undertaken for the purpose of defeating the tender offer. Distinguishing resistance from passivity will be simple in some cases and hard in others.
Management will frequently leave clues, however, that suggest its motive. The recent decision in Panter v. Marshall
Field & Co. 116 illustrates this process. Marshall Field operates
a number of high quality department and specialty stores.
Although frequently the subject of overtures to merger, Field
has rejected each one. 117 Field also made a number of acquisitions in the past, apparently for the purpose of creating
antitrust problems for potential bidders.11 8 Field resisted
again when Carter Hawley Hale, another retailer, prepared to
make a cash tender offer. Field filed suit urging that the
acquisition would violate the securities or antitrust laws; it
urged its shareholders not to tender, arguing that the price
was too low; it made several defensive acquisitions that not
only aggravated a potential antitrust problem but also made
Field less attractive as Carter's merger partner; 119 Field's
they
board authorized the management to take "such action as 20
deemed necessary" in order to defeat the offer altogether.1
Under our view that managers should be passive in response to a tender offer, Marshall Field is an easy case. Management's departure from passivity was unmistakeable and
constituted a clear breach of fiduciary duty. 121 But how would
the case have proceeded if Field had issued a public statement
of neutrality while proceeding with the acquisition? A prophylactic rule that would prevent management from making
profitable acquisitions would harm shareholders, yet applica116 486

F. Supp. 1i68 (N.D. Ill. xg8o), appeal docketed, No. 80-1375 (7th Cir.

Mar. 21, 1980).
17
1
Id., slip op. at 1177.
I I d.
9
11 Id. at 1177-84, II88-9o.
120 Id.
at Ii8O-84.
121

The district court, however, held that the directors of Marshall Field did not

violate any fiduciary duty. Id. at 1194-95. This holding was based on the premise,
erroneous in our view, that the business judgment rule provides management with
the right, and even the duty, to resist a tender offer that it deems to be not in the
best interests of the firm or its shareholders.
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tion of the usual business judgment rule would give managers
free rein to carry out disguised programs of resistance.
The timing of managerial action provides a useful, if imperfect, basis for resolving this dilemma. On the one hand,
courts could simply presume, subject to rebuttal by a litigant
who established the contrary, that any plans or programs set
in motion before target managers had reason to believe that
there would be a takeover attempt were not undertaken with
a view to resisting the tender offer. 122 Such plans would
presumptively comply with the rule of passivity and would
thus enjoy the freedom from judicial scrutiny otherwise available under the business judgment rule. 123 On the other hand,
if actions that materially hindered either the offer or the acquisition were taken immediately after management first had
reason to know of an impending offer, then courts could presume that the actions were undertaken with a view to defeating the offer. 12 4 The target's managers could be allowed to
overcome the presumption, but only by a substantial demonstration that their actions were undertaken for the economic
benefit of the target rather than for the purpose of defeating
the offer.

122

The business judgment rule should not apply, however, to unambiguous prev-

entive defense tactics such as shark-repellant charter and bylaw amendments. This
type of resistance (which, we have emphasized, is a form of suboptimal management)
should be prohibited per se.
123 The principal problem with any such approach is that it creates an incentive
for managers to take their defensive steps in advance - to build moats and barricades.
They could, for example, insert in the bylaws of the firm provisions that make
takeover costly; a bonus of $20 million to be paid to any person involuntarily transferred from one job to another, or a mandatory dividend of $20 per share whenever
one person gains more than 25% of the shares would be possible (if farfetched)
provisions. These second-best responses could in principle be as effective as existing
defensive strategies in preventing takeovers, yet we know (from the fact that they are
not now employed) that they are more costly to the target than today's antitakeover
devices. Our proposal is hardly desirable if it simply drives managers to construct
new methods of resistance or new ways of disguising old methods. We conclude,
nonetheless, that problems of second-best solutions are not a sufficient objection to
the analysis presented here. Similar objections could be raised to most other legal
rules. The rule against price-fixing cartels, for example, might induce firms to substitute territorial or customer allocations that are costly to design, enforce, and disguise. Yet society has sufficient confidence in the benefits of the rule against price
fixing that the risk of such undetectable devices seems worth running. The same is
true with tender offers.
124 See cases cited note 4 supra. In some cases, however, management will resist
a tender offer in order to prevent the offer from interfering with plans set in motion
before the takeover attempt. See Crouse-Hinds Co. v. InterNorth, Inc., 634 F.2d
69o (2d Cir. ig8o). Resistance in this situation is inconsistent with our proposal of
managerial passivity and should be prohibited.
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This allocation of burdens places on the management which has a clear conflict of interest and superior access to
information about the reasons for and consequences of its
deeds - the responsibility of justification. It meets two essential criteria: it does not incapacitate management from seizing
profitable business opportunities just because another firm is
attempting to acquire the target, and it also does not freely
allow defensive strategems. We do not doubt that the standard
would prove troublesome in some cases, but it would resolve
most cases, such as Marshall Field, quickly and inexpensively.

